





Americans watch a lot of television-the average American watches over
four hours of television a day.' It is not surprising, then, that television is the
primary source of news for most Americans.' Of those who watch news on
television, the majority of viewers cite local news as their main source of po-
litical information.' This places local news stations in a powerful position to
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I Press Release, Nielsen Company, Nielsen Reports Television Tuning Remains at
Record Levels (Oct. 17. 2007), available at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/ (search for
"Nielsen Reports Television Tuning Remains at Record Levels"). This equates to approxi-
mately thirty hours per week, over two months per year. See id.
2 See Steven Chafee & Stacey Frank, How Americans Get Political Information: Print
Versus Broadcast News, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 48, 49 (1996). This still
appears to be true. A 2004 study showed that 59% of Americans receive their news from
local news, compared to cable news (38%) and Internet (29%). PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
NEWS AUDIENCE INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED: ONLINE NEWS AUDIENCE LARGER 3, 5 (2004),
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/215.pdf, cf Pew Research Center for Excel-
lence in Journalism, 2007 State of the News Media Radio Report: Public Attitudes (Mar. 12,
2007), http://www.journalism.org/node/7257 (citing to a Radio and Television News Direc-
tors Foundation survey, which found that 65.6% of people receive their news from local
news, 28.3% from cable news, and 11.2% from the Internet).
3 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Does Local News Measure Up?, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 410, 410 (2007). A study done by the Pew Research Center shows that 76% of Ameri-
cans receive their election coverage from television compared to the 28% who get their
information from newspapers, 15% from radio, 10% from the Internet, and 2% from maga-
zines. Id.; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VOTERS IM-
PRESSED WITH CAMPAIGN: BUT NEWS COVERAGE GETS LUKEWARM RATINGS 5 (2004),
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/230.pdf [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH VOTERS IMPRESSED].
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educate the public on a wide range of important issues, including substantive
political issues. Yet, the local news media spends little time covering elec-
tions.' Thus, in order to effectively communicate their positions and gain name
recognition, politicians must pay for television advertisements. Elections are
intended to be free--candidates have to meet minimal requirements to run, and
U.S. citizens have to attain a minimum age and meet few other requirements to
vote. Unfortunately, something free has never been so expensive.' Modem
elections force today's political candidates to spend millions on such broadcast
advertising in an effort to spread their message to the voting public.6 In fact, in
2008, candidate media advertisements expenditures are expected to reach $940
million.7 Candidate advertising and media expenditures are not effective; stud-
ies have shown a correlation between campaign contributions raised, and there-
fore money to spend, and the percentage of the vote a candidate receives Ac-
The study notes further that those who receive their information from television rely primar-
ily on local broadcasts as opposed to cable channels. Fowler et al., supra, at 410; see also
PEW RESEARCH VOTERS IMPRESSED, supra, at 5.
4 See infra Part III.A.
5 In early American elections, states may have actually intended participation in an
election to be costly. See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
At the time our Nation was founded many States had property qualifications for vot-
ing. It was believed that only a man who wanted to preserve his land and wealth was
responsible enough to participate in political affairs. Fortunately, our concept of politi-
cal equality has developed tremendously since that time. Now the belief that all citi-
zens, regardless of wealth, should have an equal opportunity to participate in politics is
an axiom of our political system. This idea that wealth could be a prerequisite for vot-
ing today would be met with well-deserved outrage.
Id. (quoting Senator Muskie testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Communications as to the effects of expensive media campaigns).
6 See TNS MEDIA INTELLIGENCE, CAMPAIGN MEDIA ANALYSIS GROUP, AN ANALYSIS OF
2007 AND 2008 POLITICAL, ISSUE AND ADVOCACY ADVERTISING 5 (2007), http://www.tns-
mi.com/downloads/CMAGForecast.pdf [hereinafter TNS 2007/2008 ANALYSIS].
7 See id (stating Senate candidates are expected to spend an estimated $220-250 mil-
lion, House candidates $200-230 million, and presidential candidates $400-460 million).
When taking into account state and national parties, as well as issue advocacy groups, the
pre-election estimation of the total amount that candidates, parties, advocacy groups will
spend is over $2 billion. See id. Some analysts expect the number to climb even higher, to
$3 billion. Louis Hau, Political Ad Spending to Climb Sharply, FORBES.COM, Dec. 07, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/media/2007/l 2/07/politics-campaign-spending-biz-media-
cxlh 1207bizpolitics.html.
8 See GARY KALMAN & ADAM LIOz, U.S. PUB. INTERNET RESEARCH GROUP EDUC.
FUND, RAISING THE LIMITS: A BAD BET FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 4 (2006), available
at http://www.pirg.org/democracy/reports/raisingthelimits.pdf. In the 2004 elections, win-
ners outspent losers by $281 million. Id. But see DANIEL WEEKS, AM. FOR CAMPAIGN RE-
FORM, DOES MONEY BUY ELECTIONS? THE IMPACT OF SPENDING ON U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGNS 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.just6dollars.org/assets/2008/03/28/
Policy.pdf (discussing the theory that campaign spending may reach a plateau where addi-
tional dollars spent do not result in additional votes); STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUB-
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cordingly, candidates who wish to compete in today's political marketplace
must have an impressive rrsumd and an inordinate ability to raise money.9
The cost of a modem political campaign affects both challengers and in-
cumbents equally. For example, challengers must rely heavily on costly media
communications to overcome incumbents' name recognition. Yet, despite the
advantage of an established name and a constituent services account, incum-
bents still spend a significant amount of time raising money to protect their
seat." Consequently, the current environment creates a pool of viable candi-
dates and representatives who lack socioeconomic and racial diversity." The
need to raise money has forced candidates and incumbents to spend countless
hours with wealthy individuals, 3 which puts the candidates out of touch with
the average American. 4 Free access to broadcast media would counteract these
flaws in the system by providing better access to broadcast media to all quali-
fied individuals running for office, regardless of their socioeconomic back-
ground. Furthermore, a system of free airtime would aid candidates in focusing
on issues other than fundraising, because candidates would not need to raise
the money necessary to fend an expensive broadcast advertising campaign.
This article will examine the legal and philosophical foundations of free
media for federal candidates. Part II examines the legislative and legal history
NER, FREAKONOMICS 7-10 (rev. ed. 2006) (2005) (theorizing the inverse: a winning and
electable candidate has the ability to raise more money and therefore can spend more
money).
9 See Thomas B. Edsall & Chris Cillizza, Money's Going to Talk in 2008, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 2006, at Al.
10 WEEKS, supra note 8 at 2 ("[M]ass media communication is the only viable means of
obtaining the level of name recognition that is required for voters to take note.").
1 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL., BREAKING FREE WITH FAIR ELECTIONS: A NEW
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR CONGRESS 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.
cleanupwashington.org/documents/breakingfree.pdf.
12 See Fair Elections Now Act, to Reform the Finance of Senate Elections and on the
High Cost of Broadcasting Campaign Advertisements: Hearing on S. 1285 Before the S.
Comm. on Rules and Administration, 100th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1285]
(statement of Nick Nyhart, President and CEO, Public Campaign), available at http://rules.
senate.gov/heaings/2007/062007correctedTranscript.pdf.
13 See Edsall & Cillizza, supra note 9. Interestingly, even though candidates typically
spend the majority of their fundraising time with wealthier individuals, the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") has set individual contribution limits at $2300 per election. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm'n, Contribution Limits 2007-08, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
contriblimits.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). While this maximum contribution level
established by the FEC is not limited to only the wealthiest Americans, it may be beyond the
financial ability for the average American.
14 However, the 2008 election may have reinvented this practice, at least on the Democ-
rat side, as President Elect Barack Obama received a significant portion of his contributions
from small donors. Wayne Slater, Has Obama's Fundraising Doomed Public Financing?
His War Chest Success over McCain Puts System in Peril, Advocates Say, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Nov. 12, 2008 at IA, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dws/news/politics/state/stories/DN-obamamoneyl 2tex.ART.State.Edition2.4a87 I b2.html.
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of the regulation of political speech. Part III explores the lack of adequate free
media relating to substantive issues in political campaigns. Part IV looks at the
rising cost of political advertising and how this cost severely limits the pool of
candidates available to run for office. Finally, Part V examines the constitu-
tionality of a system of free airtime for political candidates and the provisions
necessary to make a system of free airtime successful.
II. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF
POLITICAL SPEECH
A. The Political Aspect of the Public Interest Standard
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") have long
tried to "reconcile the competitive commercial pressures of broadcasting with
the needs of a democracy when the two seem to be in conflict."' 5 Both Con-
gress and the FCC realize that in order to serve the public most effectively,
government intervention into the broadcasting market sometimes is neces-
sary. 6 Among other things, Congress and the FCC have required certain pro-
gramming to better educate the public in community affairs or the electoral
process. 7 The development of the public interest standard represents one such
intervention. 8
Prior to 1912, radio airwaves were used primarily for transmitting messages
via ham radios, as opposed to the listening device now familiar to the general
public. 9 The popularity of "amateur broadcasting" and limited regulation re-
sulted in spectrum interference, which made communication difficult or im-
15 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE 18 (1998) [hereinafter
CHARTING THE FUTURE], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/piac/piacreport.pdf; The
Supreme Court explained the FCC's justification in the FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California:
Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has power to regulate the use of
this scarce and valuable national resource. The distinctive feature of Congress' efforts
in this area has been to ensure through the regulatory oversight of the FCC that only
those who satisfy the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" are granted a license
to use radio and television broadcast frequencies.
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
309(a) (1982)). See also Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Regulation of Obscenity, Indecency &
Profanity, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (discussing the authority
given to the FCC by Congress to regulate obscenity, indecency, and profanity).
16 See CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 15, at 17.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Carrie McLaren, A Brief History of the Public Interest Standard, http://www.
stayfreemagazine.org/ml/readings/public interest.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
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possible." The 1912 Titanic disaster brought the issue of ineffective radio
communication to the attention of the public.2' Shortly after the disaster, the
government forced amateurs out of the most desirable portion of the spectrum
and regulated the public airwaves with the enactment of the Radio Act of 1912
("1912 Act").22 The 1912 Act granted the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
("Secretary") the power to issue radio licenses to citizens upon request.23 How-
ever, Congress overestimated the availability of spectrum, underestimated the
popularity of radio licenses, and failed to grant the Secretary authority to reject
spectrum applications.24
In response to the failure of the 1912 Act to solve the spectrum scarcity
problem, Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927 ("1927 Act").2 ' The 1927
Act established the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"),26 which Congress
charged with distributing and renewing licenses "to give fair, efficient, and
equitable radio service" for the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."27
The 1927 Act also established a regulatory model founded on the theory that
broadcasters were "public trustees who were privileged to use a scarce public
resource. ' 28 The FRC described the public trustee model, noting that even
though broadcast stations were privately owned they must operate in the pub-
lic's interest.29 In the 1927 Act and consistent with the FRC's concept of the
public trustee, Congress first established the public interest standard that en-
abled the FRC to reject license applications for failure to satisfy the "public
20 See HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION 7 (2000). Interference
was so bad that when "two or more broadcasters tried to operate on the same frequency in
the same region, they would cancel each other out." Id.
21 SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING: 1899-1922, at 232 (Johns
Hopkins Paperbacks ed., 1989) (1987).
22 Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927,
Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 39, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174; DOUGLAS, supra note 21, at 233 (Johns Hop-
kins Paperbacks ed., 1989) (1987); see Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public
Interest " Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 608 (1998).
23 Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287.
24 Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 22, at 607.
25 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102; see Krasnow & Goodman,
supra note 22, at 608-10.
26 Radio Act of 1927 § 3.
27 Id.§9.
28 Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 22, at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Id.
Despite the fact that the conscience and judgment of a station's management are neces-
sarily personal the station itself must be operated as if owned by the public. It is as if
people of a community should own a station and turn it over to the best man in sight
with this injunction: Manage this station in our interest. The standing of every station is
determined by that conception.
Id. (quoting The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of
Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5, 14 (1950)).
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interest, convenience, or necessity."3 °
Unfortunately, other than adopting the public interest standard, Congress
provided little guidance to the FRC and broadcasters as to what the public in-
terest standard entailed.3 Two years later, the FRC's Third Annual Report pro-
vided guidance on the public interest standard stating it would "favor broad-
casters who seemed the most inclined toward serving the public good and the
least inclined toward promoting their own 'private and selfish interests."' 32 In
the context of political speech, the FRC determined that the proper interpreta-
tion of the public interest required a balancing between free speech and an im-
partial "presentation of political views."33 Unfortunately, this vague determina-
tion by the FRC in effect left the public interest interpretation to broadcast li-
censees, ultimately leading to the decision in Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Radio Commission.34
The decision in Great Lakes involved three radio stations that challenged the
FRC's denial of a modification to their licenses for alleged failure to serve the
public interest.35 The FRC argued that the stations' programming failed to meet
30 See Radio Act of 1927 § 9; see also id. §§ 4, 11 (requiring the FRC to examine the
public convenience, interest, or necessity for license renewals and for making periodic de-
terminations including the assignment of spectrum bands). For the purposes of this paper
any discussion of the public interest standard or the obligations it imposes on broadcasters
will focus only on the need to educate the public on political issues. However, the public
interest standard generally exceeds political speech. It requires that stations meet the
tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the listening public . . . in
some fair proportion by a well-rounded program, in which entertainment, consisting of
music of both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, impor-
tant public events, discussions of public questions, weather, market reports, and news,
and matters of interest to all members of the family find a place.
Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 22, at 611-12 (quoting Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 FRC
ANN. REP 32, 34 (1929) (omission in original)).
31 See William E. Kennard, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Preliminary Views in
Support of FCC Authority to Require Broadcasters to Prove Free or Reduced-Rate Air Time
to Political Candidates (Feb. 19, 1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
Statements/stwek809.html. Chairman Kennard noted "Congress largely has chosen not to
develop the contours of the public interest standard itself ... but instead generally has al-
lowed [the FCC] to develop and adjust that standard to meet changing circumstances ...
Id.
32 McLaren, supra note 19 (quoting ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
MASS MEDIA & DEMOCRACY 27 (1st ed. 1993)). The FRC admitted that commercial adver-
tising was a necessary evil and exempted for selfish reasons-it "fumishe[d] the economic
support for the service and thus [made] it possible." MCCHESNEY, supra, at 27.
33 MCCHESNEY, supra note 32, at 28. This determination was largely in response to
propaganda stations, or stations that focus on one religious, political, social, and economic
idea. Id. at 27-28.
34 Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930). The
D.C. Circuit reviewed the denial of broadcast license modification by the FRC; the FRC
determined the broadcasters had not met their public interest standard. Id. at 995.
35 See id. at 993-95.
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the obligations imposed by the public interest standard.36 The D.C. Circuit
Court agreed and held the FRC's denial proper,37 resulting in an important evo-
lution in the regulation of the public interest. Following Great Lakes, the FRC
looked at programming content to determine if stations met the public interest
obligation." The ruling in Great Lakes affirmed the foundation for future regu-
lation in the public interest, which Congress maintained when it enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act" or "the Act").39
The 1934 Act disbanded the FRC and established the FCC,' which was
granted the authority to issue spectrum licenses and regulate broadcasters in
the public interest.4' Following the 1934 Act, the FCC continued to shape and
guide the public interest standard, culminating in the issuance of a 1946 staff
report entitled the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees ("Staff
Report").42 The report attempted to further define the public interest standard
by establishing four basic factors that broadcasters could use to fulfill their
obligations: (1) "live local programs;" (2) "public affairs programming;" (3)
"limits on excessive advertising;" and (4) "sustaining or non-sponsored pro-
grams."'43 The FCC did not officially adopt the Staff Report, but broadcasters
relied on it for guidance and ultimately issued their own standards based partly
on the FCC's StaffReport."
Throughout the years, the FCC continued to define the public interest stan-
dard, and in 1960, it issued a programming policy statement that listed a num-
ber of elements necessary to meet the public interest standard.45 The FCC in-
36 See id at 994-95.
37 Id. at 995.
38 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public
Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2105-
06 (1997) (providing a brief history of the public interest standards and explaining that Con-
gress continues to impose the obligation even while substantially changing the federal
communication regulatory scheme).
39 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 38, at 2106.
40 Communications Act of 1934, §§ 1, 602(a).
41 Id. § 301; Krotoszynski, supra note 38, at 2105. The newly created FCC went beyond
covering radio and was expected to cover "almost every kind of communications endeavor."
Id.
4 2 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES
(1946) reprinted in part in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 148-63 (Frank J.
Kahn ed., 4th ed., 1984); see Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Inter-
est, and Angels Earning Wings, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 621 (2004). The report eventually
became known as the Bluebook for its blue cover. Id.; see also Kennard, supra note 31.
43 Phillips, supra note 42, at 621-22; see also Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson,
Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification
Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L. J. 329, 343 (2004) (explaining that the Public
Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees addressed "advertising expenses").
44 Phillips, supra note 42, at 622.
45 Id. Although the FCC never concretely defined the standard, it did provide "major
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cluded "political broadcasts" among the elements in the policy statement.46 The
1960 programming policy statement was not the last time the FCC would en-
courage broadcasters to incorporate political programming into their broad-
casts.4
B. The Fairness Doctrine and Section 315(a) of the 1934 Act
Realizing the important role that broadcasters play in presenting a balanced
political view to the public, Congress enacted an opportunity requirement for
political broadcasts in the 1934 Act.4" The 1934 Act stated that "[i]f any licen-
see shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station . . . . 9 In 1959, Congress amended the 1934 Act to limit the statute's
coverage, excluding
(1) bona fide newscast[s];
(2) bona fide news interview[s];
(3) bona fide news documentar[ies] (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to
the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary); or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to politi-
cal conventions and activities incidental thereto).50
Congress made clear that the above provisions did not relieve broadcasters
from their public interest obligations.5
elements" of the standard that are "usually necessary to meet the public interest":
Sensitive to the First Amendment concerns inherent in any form of content regulation,
the Commission has never attempted to define with exact precision the programming
that a broadcaster should air to serve the needs and interests of its local community.
From time to time, however, the Commission has attempted to describe the nature of
community-responsive programming.... [The major elements] have included: (1) op-
portunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local talent, (3) pro-
grams for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6) public affairs
programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural pro-
grams, (10) news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports programs,
(13) service to minority groups, and (14) entertainment programs.
In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 12425, 12, 12429-30 n.32 (June
7, 2004).
46 Broadcast Localism, supra note 45, at 12429-30 n.32.
47 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 622-23.
48 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (codi-
fied as amended 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000)). The equal opportunity rule is also know as the
equal time rule.
49 Id.
50 Communications Act, Amendment of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, sec. 1, § 315(a), 73
Stat. 557 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000)).
51 Id.
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
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In 1949, the FCC promulgated the Fairness Doctrine,52 which required
broadcasters to "give adequate coverage to public issues" and that "coverage
must be fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views."53 The Fairness
Doctrine complimented the equal opportunity requirement, 4 and the FCC ap-
plied the Fairness Doctrine on a case-by-case basis." In 1969, a broadcaster
challenged an FCC decision made on the basis of the Fairness Doctrine. 6 Red
Lion focused on the "[p]ersonal attacks" and "political editorial" provisions of
the Fairness Doctrine. 7 The premise for the personal attack provision of the
Fairness Doctrine was simple: when a personal attack involving a public issue
was made or when a "candidate [was] endorsed in a political editorial," the
opposing or attacked party (or their representative) had to be given an opportu-
nity to respond. The broadcasters in Red Lion challenged the doctrine, argu-
ing that the "First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted fre-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and
on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
Id.
52 See In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The
report was issued following a series of hearings on editorializing by broadcasters. The hear-
ings were held on the FCC's own motion. Id.
53 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
54 See id. at 378; see also id. at 391 ("In terms of constitutional principle, and as en-
forced sharing of a scarce resource, the personal attack and political editorial rules are indis-
tinguishable from the equal-time provision of § 315, a specific enhancement of Congress
requiring stations to set aside reply time under specified circumstances and to which the
fairness doctrine and these constituent regulations are important complements.").
55 See id. at 369-70.
56 Id. at 369-70. The case involved Red Lion Broadcasting Co., a Pennsylvania radio
station, that broadcasted a short program featuring Rev. Billy James Hargis who criticized
Fred J. Cook's book, Goldwater-Extremist on the Right. Id. at 371. Hargis's criticism in-
cluded many personal attacks on Cook, including claims that Cook worked for a communist
publication. Id. at 371 n.2. Cook was upset by the broadcast and demanded free airtime to
rebut and the station refused. Id. at 371-72 The FCC determined that "the Hargis broadcast
constituted a personal attack on Cook [and] that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligation
under the fairness doctrine .... Id. at 372.
57 Id. at 373-74. The newly amended rules read
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue or public impor-
tance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity of like person qualities
of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no
event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the personal or group attacked (1)
notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or
an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer
of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
Id.
58 Id. at 378. This differs from the general Fairness Doctrine in that the FCC determined
that the best response is made by the attacked individual as opposed to broadcasters simply
presenting the attacked/opposing party's side. Id. at 378-79.
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quencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude
whomever they choose from ever using that frequency.'" 9 The Court agreed
that the First Amendment applied to broadcasters.6" However, because of spec-
trum scarcity and the large risk of disruptive interference, the Court established
that the government had a substantial interest in the regulation of broadcast-
ing." The Court held that "[i]n view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies,
the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate
claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those
frequencies for expression of their views ... the regulations and ruling at issue
here are both authorized by statute and constitutional."62 Notably, the equal
opportunity standard in section 315 and the FCC's Fairness Doctrine effec-
tively worked together to implement the public interest standard.63
The FCC largely supported the Fairness Doctrine until 1983, when it sug-
gested that if the doctrine restricted instead of furthered free speech it may be
repealed.64 In 1984, a broadcaster challenged the constitutionality of the Fair-
ness Doctrine in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California.65 League of
Women Voters focused on section 399 of the 1934 Act that provided "[n]o non-
commercial educational broadcasting station may support or oppose any can-
didate for political office."66 The Supreme Court noted that, based on the the-
ory of spectrum scarcity, broadcast regulation is subject to intermediate scru-
tiny as opposed to the strict scrutiny typically reserved for First Amendment
analysis. 7 However, despite the lower lever of scrutiny, the Supreme Court
59 RedLion, 395 U.S. at 386.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 375-76.
62 Id. at 400-01.
63 Id. at 380. (stating section 315 "vindicated the FCC's general view that the [F]airness
[D]octrine inhered in the public interest standard.").
64 In re Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules,
Proposed Rule, 21, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,298, 28,301 (proposed June 21, 1983)) ("If any sub-
stantial possibility exists that the [Fairness Doctrine] rules have impeded, rather than fur-
thered, First Amendment objectives, repeal may be warranted on that ground alone.").
65 FCC v. League of Women Voters of. Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984). The case in-
volved a broadcasting station that was "prohibited from editorialization" under section 399.
Id. at 370. The FCC argued that the District Court improperly applied the strict scrutiny
standard to section 399, stating that it should have applied a lower standard since broadcast-
ing was a "scarce and valuable national resource." Id. at 375-76. The District Court rejected
this view and held "that the restriction on editorializing [was not] necessary to ensure that
Government funding of noncommercial broadcast stations [did] not interfere with the bal-
anced presentation of opinion on those stations. Id. at 372.
66 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982).
67 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 ("[B]ecause broadcast regulation in-
volves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach that
we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regula-
tions serve 'compelling' governmental interests.").
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indicated that if the Fairness Doctrine ever had the effect of chilling free
speech, it would have to rethink its decision.68 Accordingly, with both the FCC
and the Supreme Court hedging their support of the Fairness Doctrine, its ero-
sion continued for the next three years.69 Finally, in 1987, the FCC "dissolved
the doctrine."7 Despite the FCC's abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine, sec-
tion 315 and the public interest standard survive.
C. Money Equals Speech: the Regulations Imposed on Candidates
The regulation of political speech exceeds the duty imposed on broadcasters
to provide fair and equal coverage in the interest of the public. In addition to
regulating broadcasts, Congress has also attempted to regulate the amount of
money candidates spend on elections.7 In 1970, Congress passed the Political
Broadcast Act,72 which attempted to limit federal and gubernatorial candidates'
spending on television and radio advertisements.73 President Nixon vetoed the
bill, arguing that it was too narrow because it did not limit non-broadcast
spending.74
Undeterred, the following year, Congress enacted the Campaign Act of
68 See id. at 378 (explaining that the First Amendment must "inform and give shape" to
regulation of speech over broadcast).
69 See, e.g., Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (holding while the Fairness Doctrine applied to the newly invented teletext tech-
nology, the FCC was not obliged to impose the doctrine on the technology); Meredith Corp.
v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 867, 872-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting the FCC found the Fairness
Doctrine no longer met the public interest standard); see also Museum of Broadcast Com-
munications, Fairness Doctrine, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/FIhtmlF/fairnessdoct/
fairnessdoct.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (stating that the former FCC Chairman, Mark
Fowler, promised to kill the Fairness Doctrine).
70 Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 69. Before the FCC repealed the
doctrine, Congress attempted to codify the doctrine, thereby forcing the FCC to apply it. Id.
However, President Reagan vetoed the bill, and Congress was unable to override the veto.
Id.
71 See, e.g., Paul Taylor & Norman Ornstein, The Case for Free Airtime: A Broadcast
Spectrum Fee for Campaign Finance Reform 18 (New Am. Found., Spectrum Series Work-
ing Paper #4, 2002), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Pub File 876 1.
pdf (explaining several attempts by Congress to limit campaign spending on advertising).
72 S. 3637, 91st Cong. (1970).
73 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 18. Prior to 1970, Congress passed a series of
other campaign finance legislation, focusing more on limitations of campaign contributions
than spending on broadcasting. For instance, the 1867 Naval Appropriations Act, which
banned forced political contributions from men working in the navy yard. Hoover Inst.,
Public Policy Inquiry, Campaign Finance, Important Dates in Federal Campaign Finance
Legislation, http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/history/financing l.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2008).
74 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 18. President Nixon stated that the proposed bill
was "only one hole in a sieve." Veto of a Political Broadcasting Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 837,
838 (Oct. 12, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2716.
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197 1, 5 which limited candidates to spending "no more than ten cents per eligi-
ble voter or $50,000, whichever was greater, on all communications media,
including print and billboards as well as broadcast."76 Additionally, the bill
prohibited federal candidates from spending more than 60% of their communi-
cation expenditures on television and radio advertisements. 7 However, the lim-
its only affected the 1972 election." The Campaign Act of 1971 was amended
in 1974 in response to the Watergate scandal.79 The amendment focused on a
more generalized limit on candidate spending and contributions"° and created
the FEC.8
In 1976, the Supreme Court took on the newly amended Campaign Act in
Buckley v. Valeo.82 The case focused on the new limits on contributions and
expenditures in the Campaign Act.83 The challengers argued limits on the
amount of funds spent on television and radio advertising restricted communi-
cation in violation of the First Amendment, since nearly all "political commu-
nications.., involved the expenditure of money."84 The Supreme Court agreed
and held that the 1974 amendment to the Campaign Act resulted in a large
burden on "the quantity and diversity of political speech."85
In contrast, the Supreme Court found that the limits on contributions placed
75 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
76 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 18; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, §
104.
77 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 104(B).
78 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 7 1, at 18.
79 Amanda S. La Forge, The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal Barriers
to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
351, 353 (1996). The amendments created a system of public financing for presidential can-
didates. Id. at 355 n.13; see also Campaign Finance Guide, Federal Election Campaign Act:
A New Era of Reform, http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-34.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2008).
80 See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 1263. The 1971 Campaign Act, as amended, limited individual contributions to
$1000 per candidate per election, limited candidates personal spending, and capped overall
candidate spending. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
81 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, sec. 208(a), § 310.
82 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6-7. Various candidates for federal office, a campaign donor,
various political parties and Political Action Committees brought this case. Id. at 7-8.
83 See id. at 7-8.
84 Id. at 11. The Court of Appeals upheld the act, equating it to United States v. O'Brien,
id. at 10, 15-16, which held the government had a important interest in "regulating the non-
speech element" of the symbolic burning of a draft card even if the regulation had an "inci-
dental restriction" on the First Amendment. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968). The Buckley Court did not share this view. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
85 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20. ("[It] would appear to exclude all citizens and groups
except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the
most effective modes of communication."(citation omitted)).
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only minimal restrictions on a contributors' right to free speech. 6 The Court
reasoned that the size of an individual's financial contribution did not prevent
political discussion.87 More concisely, the Supreme Court equated money with
speech and held that the Campaign Act's limits on expenditures were unconsti-
tutionally restrictive, while the limits on contributions were permissible."
D. Contemporary Free Speech Election Law
Modem election law focuses on three main concepts in relation to the regu-
lation of candidate speech in the area of broadcast media-reasonable access,
equal opportunity, and lowest unit charge.89 Reasonable access establishes that
a broadcaster's license may be revoked for "willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for
the use of a broadcasting station, other than a non-commercial educational
broadcast station, by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office on
behalf of his candidacy."98
In 1981, a group of broadcasters challenged the reasonable access provi-
sion.9' The suit focused on a request by the Carter-Mondale Presidential Com-
mittee ("CMPC"), which asked the "Big Three"'92 television networks to sell it
a thirty-minute time slot in early December 1979 for the broadcast of a docu-
mentary about President Jimmy Carter's record.93 The networks either refused
to air the programming-arguing that it was too early in the campaign--or said
86 Id. at 20-21.
87 Id. at 20-21. The Court suggested stricter restrictions on contributions could eventu-
ally disrupt the political discourse; however, that was not the case in Buckley. Id. Some
campaign finance reform advocates disagree with the Court's argument that the size of the
donation does not affect the political discussion. Many Americans may be excluded from
the political process because those that make large contributions seem to have a bigger voice
in the political process and the majority of candidate contributions come from people living
in wealthy zip codes. Center for Responsive Politics, Top Zip Codes, http://www.
opensecrets.org/overview/topzips.asp?cycle=2006 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) [hereinafter
Top Zip Codes] (noting donations by zip code for the 2006 elections and reflecting a large
percentage of donations coming from New York City, New York; Potomac, Maryland;
Greenwich, Connecticut; among other areas).
88 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 18.
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
90 § 312(a)(7).
9' See generally CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). The suit involved multiple
parties including the National Broadcasting Co. ("NBC") and the American Broadcasting
Cos. ("ABC"). Id.
92 The "Big Three" consisted of CBS, NBC, and ABC. John L. Sullivan & Amy B.
Jordan, Playing By the Rules: Impact and Implementation of Children's Educational Televi-
sion Regulations Among Local Broadcasters, 4 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 483, 502 (1999).
93 CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 371-72. The documentary would air immediately following
President Carter's candidacy announcement. Id.
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that they would only provide a significantly shorter timeslot.94 In response,
CMPC filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that the Big Three failed to
follow "their obligation to provide 'reasonable access.'
95
In their petition for reconsideration with the FCC, the broadcasters argued
that section 312(a)(7) did not "create a new right of access for federal candi-
dates," but simply codified FCC public interest policy.96 The CMPC disagreed
and found the plain meaning of the statutory language and the Act's legislative
history showed that Congress intended to provide a new right to access for can-
didates.97 The broadcasters ultimately appealed the case to the Supreme Court. 98
The Supreme Court agreed with the FCC and the CMPC. It found that
unlike the networks' interpretation of public interest standard, the reasonable
access provision focuses on individual candidates for federal office.99 The pub-
lic interest standard, however, created a general obligation for broadcasters,
unrelated to specific individuals.' The Court held that Congress intended to
create a new individual right for candidates.' 0' However, the Court also deter-
mined that "[b]roadcasters are free to deny the sale of air time prior to the
commencement of a campaign . "..."02 Once the campaign has officially
started broadcasters must evaluate each request individually and cannot issue a
general denial. 3 In concert with the reasonable access obligations, broadcast-
ers also must comply with the equal opportunity obligation.
The equal opportunity obligation provides that any broadcast licensee that
allows a "legally qualified candidate" to access its broadcast stations must "af-
94 Id. at 372-73. CBS offered to provide two five-minute time slots, one in primetime
and one in daytime, while ABC and NBC indicated it was too early in the political process.
Id. at 367. This is in contrast to modem broadcasters, which seem all too eager to accept
candidate dollars early in the process. In fact, candidates were spending large amounts of
money on broadcast advertisements twenty-one months before the 2008 general election.
See, e.g., Chris Cillizza & Shailagh Murray, In This Race, There's No Starting Gun, WASH.
POST, May 13, 2007 at A2 (identifying early television advertisements for the 2008 presi-
dential election).
95 CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 373-74.
96 Id. at 374, 377.
97 Id. at 376-86. The Court examined the legislative history of sections 312 and 315 and
found that section "312(a)(7) expanded on ... predecessor requirements and granted a new
right of access to persons seeking election to federal office." Id. at 386.
98 Id. at 376-77.
99 Id. at 377-78.
'oo See supra Part hl.A.
101 CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 377-78, 386. (finding in addition to the public interest stan-
dard, "§ 312(a)(7) focuses on the individual 'legally qualified candidate' seeking airtime to
advocate 'his candidacy,' and guarantees him 'reasonable access' enforceable by specific
governmental sanction." (emphasis in original)).
102 Id. at 386-87.
103 Id. at 387.
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ford equal opportunities to all other such candidates . . . ."' The FCC has es-
tablished that licensees are not permitted to discriminate "between the candi-
dates in any way," that broadcasters may adopt a policy each election cycle,
and that broadcasters must treat all candidates equally regardless of the policy
adopted. 05 Broadcasters are not required to inform candidates of other candi-
date's purchases, but they must provide the information upon request.'" To
ensure all candidates receive a fair and uniform access, the reasonable access
and equal opportunity obligations are reinforced through the lowest unit charge
obligation.
Section 315(b)(1)(A) regulates candidate broadcast advertisements by re-
quiring that licensees charge no more than the "lowest unit charge of the sta-
tion for the same class and amount of time for the same period."" 7 The lowest
unit charge is the "lowest advertising rate that a station charges other advertis-
ers for the same class and amount of time for the same period." ' The lowest
unit charge provision only applies to candidate advertisements that occur in the
forty-five days preceding a primary election and in the sixty days preceding a
general election. 9 Congress created this "provision to 'place the candidate[s]
on par with a broadcast station's most favored commercial advertiser[s]. '"""
Unfortunately, candidates' needs are distinctly different from commercial
advertisers. Political candidates need to respond to opposition attacks at the
same time of day that the attacks are aired in order to gain access to the same
audience."' The lowest unit charge provision fails to protect candidates from
broadcasters that charge candidates exorbitant prices to the guarantee that their
ads will run at a specific date and time, otherwise known as "non-preemptible
104 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
105 Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, Public Notice, 24
F.C.C.2d 832, 865 (Aug. 7, 1970).
106 Id.
107 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(I)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
108 Advisory Opinion 2006-3 1, Statement for the Record, Vice Chairman Robert D. Len-
hard, Comm. Steven T. Walther & Comm. Ellen L. Weintraub, http://www.fec.gov/
members/weintraub/aos/sorao2005-31.pdf. The Bipartisan Campaign Act amended section
315 to read "that a Federal candidate 'shall not be entitled' to the LUC if any of the candi-
date's advertisements makes a direct reference to the candidate's opponent, but fails to con-
tain a statement both identifying the candidate and stating that the candidate has approved
the communication.... Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see
also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 305(a)(3), 116 Stat.
81,101.
'09 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
110 Duchossois Communications Company of Maryland, Inc., Former Licensee, Station
WHFS-FM, Letter, 11 F.C.C.R. 5785 (Feb. 22, 1996) (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-96, at 27
(1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.N. 1773, 1780).
111 Taylor & Omstein, supra note 71, at 11; see also John S. McCain, Free Air Time:
The Continuing Reform Battle, 2 ELECT L.J. 171, 173-74 (2003).
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time.""' Non-preemptible time "is not subject to preemption during any par-
ticular daypart, program or time period.""' Alternatively, "run-of-schedule"
spots "may be preempted without prior notice to the advertiser.""' 4 Since adver-
tisements significantly impact elections and current industry and government
regulations fail to address these important considerations, Congress and the
FCC must appropriately adjust the balance of power between politician candi-
dates and broadcasters." 5
III. BALANCED ENTERTAINMENT?
Other than candidates' advertisements, local news media is the primary
source of political news for most Americans." '6 Consequently, local broadcast
news stations are in the powerful position of educating the public on a wide
range of important issues, including substantive political ones. The ability of
local news to fulfill this "duty" has become easier with the advent of advanced
communications technologies." 7 Local news stations now are able to "conduct
remote interviews through two-way satellite hookups," and "mobile satellite
trucks" allow stations to broadcast live coverage from areas across the nation,
eliminating geographic restraints."8 Unfortunately, local broadcasters have
neglected to take advantage of the opportunity provided by advancements in
technology to enhance electoral coverage. During the 2002 mid-term election
cycle, 56% of local broadcast stations offered no substantive coverage of the
112 Taylor & Omstein, supra note 71, at 11.
".. WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, POLITICAL BROADCAST MANUAL 14
(2007), available at http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/politicalbroadcastmanual.pdf.
114 Id. In 2001, the Senate attempted to change the current scheme by introducing legisla-
tion that would require broadcasters to charge only the lowest unit charge for non-
preemptible spots. McCain, supra note 111, at 175. The bill ultimately failed under pressure
from the broadcast industry lobby. Id.
11 See CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 15, at 57-58.
116 See Fowler et al., supra note 3, at 410. A study done by the Pew Research Center
shows that 76% of Americans get their election coverage from television compared to the
28% who get their information from newspapers, 15% from radio, 10% from the Internet,
and 2% from magazines. PEW RESEARCH VOTERS IMPRESSED, supra note 3, at 5. The study
further mentions that those who get their information from television rely primarily on local
broadcasts instead of cable channels. See id. at 4.
117 See Phyllis Kaniss, Assessing the Role of Local Television News in Elections: Stimu-
lating Involvement or Indifference, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 433, 434 (1993).
118 Id. Most local news stations may find it more cost effective to tap into a large net-
work's news feed rather than sending a reporter to the location of a news story. PAX and
NBC Extend Partnership Through Network and Local News Programming and Sports Pro-
gramming, BUSINESS WIRE, April 18, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/
is_2000_April_18/ai 61550715 (discussing the partnership of PAX and NBC designed to
improve local and network news coverage).
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candidates' policies and positions."9 More specifically, the local news media
has failed the public by neglecting political coverage in two ways: a lack of
substantive time devoted to political coverage and a lack of political issue cov-
erage.
A. Lack of Substantive Time
In the 2004 presidential election cycle, which focused largely on the contro-
versy surrounding the Iraq War, the broadcast networks chose to air "three or
four hours of each of the major party nominating conventions."'2 ° Also in 2004,
the former Big Three networks spent a total of 1007 minutes on campaign cov-
erage spread across 504 stories.' 2' Of these stories, the average candidate sound
bite was 7.8 seconds long.'2 2 These figures dropped from 1992 when the Big
Three spent 1400 minutes on campaign coverage across 728 stories and with
8.4 seconds devoted to candidate sound bites. 23 Fortunately, the numbers in
2004 greatly improved over 2000, despite the fact that the 2000 election fea-
tured no incumbent candidates.' 24 The increase in news coverage from the 2000
election to the 2004 election appears to indicate an effort by local news broad-
119 ROBERT M. ENTMAN, AMERICAN MEDIA AND THE QUALITY OF VOTER INFORMATION V
(2004), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA7
04F5%7D/AMERICANMEDIA.PDF. Despite the enormous responsibility local news sta-
tions should have to the public, they continue to "be a surrogate rubbemecker, taking us to
crime scenes, murder trials, and traffic accidents, where we can do little but gawk." Ian
Donnis, In Whose Interest?, BOSTON PHOENIX, Nov. 21-28, 2002, http://www.
bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/other stories/multi-page/documents/02552294.
htm (quoting a report by the Project for Excellence in Journalism).
120 ENTMAN, supra note 119, at 7. Notably, the nominees were set long before the con-
vention occurred, greatly diminishing the excitement of the process. See Costas Panagopou-
lous, Behind the Balloons: Political Consultants and the National Nominating Conventions,
CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, July 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2519/is_/
ai n6142582.
121 Campaign 2004 Final: How TV News Covered the General Election Campaign, (Ctr.
for Media and Pub. Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Campaign
2004 Coverage], available at http://www.cmpa.com/files/mediamonitor/04novdec.pdf.
This study focused only on broadcast evening newscasts aired on ABC, CBS, and NBC. Id.
at 1.
122 Id. The time afforded to candidate sound bites has dropped immensely since 1968
when presidential candidates received an average of 43 seconds. Norman Solomon, The
Conventional News Wisdom of Network Television, ALTERNET, Aug. 3, 2004, http://www.
altemet.org/columnists/story/19444/?page=entire (quoting the Alliance for Better Cam-
paigns).
123 Campaign 2004 Coverage, supra note 121, at 5.
124 See id. The 2004 election featured incumbent President George W. Bush and Senator




casters to improve campaign coverage. 5
The lack of substantive campaign coverage is more apparent with campaigns
for the seats in the House of Representatives. A study of eleven broadcast mar-
kets in the United States showed that 61% of the 2004 campaign coverage fo-
cused on presidential candidates, while only 8% of all broadcasts focused on
local elections including candidates' House seats.'26 In Los Angeles, California,
no story on a House race ran in any local news broadcasts during the period
studied. 27 The numbers improved in Dallas, Texas, where some House races
were competitive, but not by much; the amount of presidential coverage still
dwarfed House coverage by a ratio of "six-to-one."'28
While the presidential race is undoubtedly important, viewers deserve to be
informed of the views and policies of their local candidates. In total in 2004, an
average half-hour local news program devoted three minutes and eleven sec-
onds to the election (with two minutes of that coverage focusing on the presi-
dential races), six minutes and twenty-one seconds to sports and weather, and
almost nine minutes to advertising.'29 Unfortunately, the lack of political cov-
erage is not the only failing of local broadcasters.
B. Lack of Substantive Issue Coverage
Commentators commonly cite three problems with local news coverage:
heavy reliance on the horse race (i.e. broadcasters focus more on campaign
tactics than substantive coverage); 3° "misuse of public opinion polls;" and fo-
125 See generally PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S PROJECT FOR THE EXCELLENCE IN JOURNAL-
ISM, ELECTION NIGHT 2006: AN EVENING IN THE LIFE OF AMERICAN MEDIA 1-2 (2006), avail-
able at http:/ www.journalism.org/files/ELECTION%202006%20REPORT%20FIRST%20
RELEASE.pdf (discussing the quality of thirty-two different news outlets during 2006 elec-
tion night coverage).
126 MARTIN KAPLAN, KEN GOLDSTEIN & MATTHEW HALE, LOCAL NEWS COVERAGE OF
THE 2004 CAMPAIGNS: AN ANALYSIS OF NIGHTLY BROADCASTS IN 11 MARKETS 9 (2005),
available at http://www. localnewsarchive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf. In this study,
local elections comprised of U.S. House seats; state races, such as state senate or state
house; mayor or city council; and even local law enforcement. Id. at 9. The study focused on
eleven markets including; "four of them large (New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and
Dallas), five mid-sized (Seattle, Tampa, Miami, Denver and Orlando) and two small (Day-
ton and Des Moines)." Id. at 5. Additionally, "the study examined 4333 news broadcasts, or
2166 hours of local news programming, over a 29-day period." Id. at 8.
127 Id. at 9.
128 Id. at 10, 15.
129 Id. at 11-12. Breaking down the rest of the numbers provides a clear explanation of
why local news is a poor source of substantive political information: the studied markets
devoted twenty-eight seconds to non-election governmental coverage, thirteen seconds to
foreign policy, and forty-seven seconds to business and the economy. Id. at 12.
130 See Kaniss, supra note 117, at 435; see also Kevin Modesti, In These Cases, It's a
Race to the Finish, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 2008, at C 1.
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cus on the tabloid aspect of candidates' personal lives. 3' In 2004, 57% of the
presidential coverage of and 61% of Senate race coverage focused not on is-
sues, but on the horse race.3 2 These numbers largely represent the past few
election cycles.'33 In 2000, 71% of broadcast news stories focused on the horse
race and in both 1988 and 1992, 58% of stories focused on the horse race.
134
This means that the bulk of news coverage focuses not on issue education, but
rather on "voter projections" and the "mechanics of campaigning," leaving the
electorate with a substantially deficient understanding of candidates policies
and positions. "
Another common criticism of local news is its focus on public opinion
polls.'36 However, the broadcasters' heavy reliance on polling results is not
entirely negative. Polls provide voters with an opportunity to determine which
candidates deserve their vote because of the candidate's probability of being
elected.'37 Nevertheless, focusing on public opinion polls can become a nega-
tive if it results in the electorate voting for candidates based only on their
electability versus their positions.'
Another issue with polls is a candidate's ability to gain free media exposure,
which strongly correlates with the candidate's poll position. This is especially
notable in televised debates where candidates are not permitted to participate
unless they have "acceptable" ratings in the latest polls.'39 This presents a cir-
cular problem: candidates with low poll numbers need to rely on free media
coverage to gain exposure, but they will not receive this coverage unless they
climb in the polls. Critics argue that this system causes a reduction in voter
choice. 4 °
Critics also argue that campaign news coverage focuses more on the scan-
dals surrounding candidates' lives than on the candidates' positions. 4 ' For ex-
131 Kaniss, supra note 117, at 435.
132 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 13. Another study focusing only on the Big
Three's evening news broadcasts in 2004 found the amount of overall political coverage to
be nearly equal, 48% horse race and 49% policy issues. See Campaign 2004 Coverage,
supra note 121,at 2.
133 See Fowler et al., supra note 3 at 422 (stating that in 2002, 48% of local news cover-
age focused on the horse race versus 24% on substantive issues).
134 Campaign 2004 Coverage, supra note 121, at 5.
135 Kaniss, supra note 117, at 437-38.
136 Id. at 436.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 436-37.
139 Tim Cramm, The Designated Nonpublic Forum: Remedying the Forbes Mistake, 67
ALB. L. REv. 89, 91 (2003).
140 See id. at 91.
41 See Kaniss, supra note 117, at 437-38 (discussing the 1992 presidential election




ample, the 2006 mid-term election coverage focused not on substantive issues,
but on the plethora of scandals that erupted during the election cycle.'42 How-
ever, 2006 was not the first time that candidate scandals stole the headlines
during an election cycle.'43 Focusing on what a candidate does behind closed
doors may be more exciting than that candidate's stance on economic devel-
opment, but it does little to highlight a candidate's qualifications for office.'"
C. Who Failed Who First?
The lack of news coverage on substantive political issues has led to a largely
politically uninformed public.'45 For example, in the 2000 presidential election,
polls showed that a mere two days before the election, voters were unable to
answer basic questions about the presidential candidates' key policy posi-
tions.'46 More recent studies show that the majority of voters who voted for
President George W. Bush in 2004 believed that weapons of mass destruction
had already been found in Iraq and that "a majority of the world supported the
Iraqi war.'147 The question, however, is whether broadcasters have neglected
their duty to protect the public interest by failing to educate viewers on politi-
cal issues or whether broadcasters simply provide viewers what they want. 48
142 The Democratic Counter-Revolution, TV News Coverage of the 2006 Midterm Elec-
tions, MEDIA MONITOR (Ctr. for Media & Pub. Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 2006 at 3-
4, available at http://www.cmpa.com/files/mediamonitor/06sepoct.pdf (citing statistics on
scandals during the 2006 election including Congressman Mark Foley's alleged misconduct
with a Congressional page and Senator George Allen's alleged racist remarks towards his
opponent's campaign staff member).
143 See e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Gary Hart's Back Door Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, January
26, 2003, sec. 4, at 2, (explaining that in 1987 allegations about marital infidelity led to
former Sen. Gary Hart dropping out of the race); Ted Barrett, John Mercurio & John Bisney,
Ryan Drops Out of Senate Race in Illinois, CNN.COM, June 25, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/25/il.ryan/ (explaining that Jack Ryan dropped out of the Senate
race after the media uncovered and focused on allegations in divorce court filings that he
visited sex clubs with his former wife).
144 See Kaniss, supra note 117, at 438.
145 See Chafee & Frank, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that television watchers are "less able
to answer factual questions about politics than are those who say they rely more on print.").
146 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 13 (stating that more than half of those polled
could not state the candidates' positions on key issues such as abortion, gun control, Social
Security, and school vouchers). This trend continued in 2008; the majority of voters stated
they know "very little" about Sen. Obama's or Sen. McCain's economic or foreign policy
positions. See Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Candidates' Policy Posi-
tions Still Not Widely Known (July 16, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/899/candidates-
policy-positions-still-not-widely-known.
147 Paul Waldman, An Uninspired Press Translates into an Uninformed Electorate, USA
TODAY MAG., Nov. 2005, at 56.
148 See CYNTHIA GORNEY, THE BusINEss OF NEWS: A CHALLENGE FOR JOURNALISM'S
NEXT GENERATION 1-3 (2002), available at http://www.carnegie.org/pdf/businessoffiews2.
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The answer is complex. First, it appears networks may undervalue viewers'
desire for substantive political news.'49 A recent study showed that individuals
want more substantive campaign coverage, including more coverage on candi-
dates' position on the issues, as well as increased coverage of lesser-known
candidates and their policies. 5 Moreover, studies have also shown that news
stations that air substantive stories focusing on issues or policies are more
likely to retain their lead-in audience.' Regardless of these statistics, local
news stations allow public broadcasting stations or cable networks to provide
the substantive coverage viewers seek.'52 The broadcasters' lack of substantive
political coverage may give the impression that political coverage is only
suited for a specific audience and is neither wanted nor needed by the general
public.'
Many critics of local news argue that the lack of substantive political cover-
age by local news is based on broadcasters' desire to increase advertising reve-
nue.'54 In general, local news is profitable, accounting for nearly 42% of total
station revenue.'" While political advertisements make up a significant per-
centage of this revenue-possibly $3 billion in 2008 56 -advertisers maintain
constant pressure on local stations to broadcast "soft news."'57 Soft news sto-
pdf.
149 Cf ENTMAN, supra note 119 (stating that many Americans use "local television news-
casts as their leading source of political information," but that slightly more than half (56%)
of local newscasts did not provide coverage during the 2002 mid-term elections).
150 Jeffrey M. McCall, Editorial, The Polls Are In: Viewers Want Better TV Election
Coverage, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://www.collegenews.
org/x7789.xml (citing a study by the Pew Research Center finding that 80% of voters want
more substantive coverage and more coverage of lesser-known candidates). Another study
indicated that the majority (88%) of the public believes the media covers only trivial cam-
paign issues. Id. Contra Donnis, supra note 119 (discussing a study by the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters finding the exact opposite; specifically, 43% of the public thinks that
local broadcasters spend "too much time" covering elections).
151 See Tom Rosenstiel & Marion Just, Five Ways to Build Viewership, COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REv., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 92. In 2000, The Project for Excellence in Journalism
released a "Magic Formula" describing key qualities of popular news stations, among other
things they include, "[a]ir fewer crime stories," "[alir more local stories," and "[d]o less
horse-race-style political coverage." Tom Rosensteil, Carl Gottlieb & Lee Ann Brady, Time
of Perilfor TV News, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 84, 88.
152 See ENTMAN, supra note 119, at 7.
153 See id. (arguing that the Big Three's lack of political coverage in primetime "sends a
message: Politics is not important enough to be in broadcast primetime, so it must not be
very important.").
154 See Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 14.
155 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF
THE NEWS MEDIA: LOCAL TV (2008), http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2008/narrative_
localtv intro.php?cat=-0&media=8.
156 TNS 2007/2008 ANALYSIS, supra note 6.
157 See Marion Just & Rosalind Levine, News for Sale, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Nov.-
Dec. 2001, at 2.
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ries largely are devoted to "health and consumer issues;' 5 8 presumably, local
stations can bring in higher revenue with soft news because viewers are in a
better frame of mind when considering the product advertised.
By not broadcasting political information in primetime, the networks essen-
tially suggest that politics are not important.'59 The solution cannot simply be to
blame the media, since the lack of true enforcement of public interest obliga-
tions by the FCC only serves to exacerbate the problem. Regrettably, the
FCC's failure to enforce the public interest standard is largely founded on the
fact that Congress has never established the necessary framework to determine
effectively if the standard is met. 6 ' However, despite the absence of any spe-
cific legal framework, Congress has required the FCC to enforce the public
interest through the issuance or renewal of broadcasts licenses based on "pub-
lic interest, convenience, and necessity."'' While implementing this mandate
may be difficult, the implementation is well worth the improvement in the
quality of information provided.
Unfortunately, adequate enforcement of the standard is difficult as the FCC
receives little to no programming information from broadcasters, and thus has
no real way to determine whether broadcast licensees fulfill their public inter-
est obligations.'62 Despite this lack of information, the FCC has typically cho-
sen not to audit or inspect the broadcast industry's lineup.'63 The FCC appears
to rely solely on the public to bring public interest failures to its attention;'
64
this is inadequate considering a large portion of the public is unaware of the
public interest obligations imposed on broadcasters.
Despite a plethora of new media making political information more accessi-
ble, the majority of broadcast news viewers do not seek alternative sources of
information. 65 The viewing population can be bifurcated into entertainment
158 See id. at 3.
'59 See ENTMAN, supra note 119, at 7.
160 Henry Geller & Tim Watts, The Five Percent Solution: A Spectrum Fee to Replace
the "Public Interest Obligations" of Broadcasters 4 (New Am. Found., Spectrum Series
Working Paper #3, 2002), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/
Pub File 844_l.pdf ("Congress never designated a regulatory structure to enforce broad-
casters' obligations nor even established guidelines for implementing the public interest
standard.").
161 See In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, Notice ofInquiry, 14
F.C.C.R. 21,633, 1 (Dec. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Public Interest Notice].
162 Geller & Watts, supra note 160, at 7.
163 See id
164 Id. ("This reliance is wholly misplaced .... Even though people may send letters
complaining about the disappearance of a favorite program or some content feature, they
can hardly be expected to examine station files, analyze the data, and then file a petition to
deny.").
165 See Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 13-14; see also MARKUS PRIOR, POST-
BROADCAST DEMOCRACY: How MEDIA CHOICE INCREASES INEQUALITY IN POLITICAL IN-
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viewers and news viewers."6 News viewers turn towards cable and the Internet
for information and increasingly are becoming informed and involved.'67 On
the other hand, entertainment viewers choose to tune out political coverage,
despite having access to cable and Internet sources, resulting in a decrease in
political participation and awareness. 6 In short, even though alternative news
sources continue to increase, America's interest in the political process contin-
ues to decrease. 69 This presents a conundrum for candidates because, on one
hand, broadcast viewers seem to want more substantive political coverage, but
the majority of viewers refuse to seek out alternative news sources. As a result,
candidates have turned to political advertising as their primary means of in-
forming voters.' However, informing primarily through broadcast advertising
does not come without cost.
IV. THE HIGH COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING
Since the invention of the television, candidates have recognized its role in
reaching mainstream America, and by 1952, presidential candidates already
spent large amounts on television advertising. 7' Over half a century later
"there can be no doubt that we are in the 'era of television campaigning.
1 72
Campaigning on television has provided many benefits to candidates and the
public alike.'73 First, it allows candidates to broadcast their views directly to the
VOLVEMENT AND POLARIZES ELECTIONS 155 (2007) ("Even though Americans may consume
more news, more Americans also tune out the news altogether.").
166 See PRIOR, supra note 165, at 42.
167 Id. at 156 (noting "[n]ews junkies ... consum[e] more news then ever.").
168 See id. at 134-35; see also id. at 115 ("In a media environment where people cannot
choose between entertainment and news, it does not matter very much if they prefer one or
the other. Among those with access to new media, on the other hand, the impact of enter-
tainment preference is substantial."); Id. at 156 (explaining that while cable has created a
class of "news junkies," it also contributed to a decrease in the size of the audience for each
newscast).
169 See Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 14; see also PRIOR, supra note 165, at 151
("As a result of greater media choice, fewer Americans watch the news and learn about
politics than in the past.").
170 See Geoffrey Cowan, Whatever Happened to Local News?: The "Vast Wasteland"
Reconsidered, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 493, 497 (2003). In the weeks leading up to the 2000
election, "stations that were selling 30, 40, or even 50 political campaign ads per night were
airing, on average, less than one minute a night of substantive coverage of political races."
McCain, supra note 11l, at 174.
171 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("By the 1952 campaign, presi-
dential candidates were spending millions of dollars on television."), affd CBS, Inc. v. FCC
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
172 Id. at 10.
173 See Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 815, 821 (2001).
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public.'74 This ensures that candidates can convey a complete thought as op-
posed to a 7.8-second sound bite.' Television broadcasting also provides can-
didates complete control over their campaign's message.'76 Secondly, on aver-
age, the more money candidates spend on advertising, the greater percentage of
the vote they receive.' In fact, Prof. Thomas Stratmann found "a 1000 unit
increase in advertising increased the incumbent's vote shares by 3.1 percentage
points and increased the challenger's vote shares by over 6 percentage
points."'' Finally, despite the astronomical cost of broadcast advertising, it is a
candidate's most cost-effective option for reaching voters.'79
However, television campaigning has its own shortcomings. First, raising
the amount of money it takes to run an effective media campaign takes a sig-
nificant amount of time and effort for challengers and incumbents alike. 8 Due
to short terms, members of the House of Representatives usually start raising
money for their next campaign the same day they are sworn in to office; this
process continues seven days-a-week in an effort to raise nearly $1000 a day
before the next election. 8' Senators have loftier goals: raising nearly $3000 a
day between elections.'82 This money is not easily raised-House members and
Senators spend nearly one-third of their time in office fundraising for the next
campaign.'83 The obsession with the money-chase results in forcing members
174 Id.
175 See Campaign 2004 Coverage, supra note 121, at 5 (charting election coverage from
1988 through 2004-in 2004 the average sound bite was 7.8 seconds).
176 William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw.
U.L. REV. 335, 343 (2000).
177 See Thomas Stratmann, The Effectiveness of Money in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78
S. CAL. L. REv. 1041, 1061 (2005). But see WEEKS, supra note 8, at 1-2 (arguing that cam-
paign expenditures experience diminishing returns).
178 Stratmann, supra note 177, at 1061 (citation omitted). Contra Stephen Ansolabehere,
Alan S. Gerber & James M. Snyder, Jr., Does TV Advertising Explain the Rise of Campaign
Spending? A Study of Campaign Spending and Broadcast Advertising Prices in US House
Elections the 1990s and the 1970s 22 (2001), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/
files/1211 ("We find no evidence of an important relationship between TV costs and the
vote shares of incumbents ....").
179 Marshall, supra note 176, at 343. Grass roots advertising and its necessary expenses
of buttons, bumper stickers, and other paraphernalia produce little bang for their bucks. See
id.
180 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.
181 Id.
182 Id. The average Senate campaign in 2006 cost nearly $7.8 million. Hearing on S.
1285, supra note 12 (statement of Nick Nyhart, President and CEO, Public Campaign).
183 Ernest F. Hollings, Stop the Money Chase: A Constitutional Amendment Could Let
Senators Be Senators, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at B7. Former Sen. Hollings suggests
that the Senate work week has dissolved into only three full days that constantly is disrupted
by holiday weeks such as "Memorial Day week" and "Fourth of July week," in an effort to




of Congress to compromise their duty to represent their electorate in order to
have time to fundraise.' 4
Furthermore, the high cost of an effective broadcast campaign reduces the
pool of candidates available to run for office." 5 Former FEC chairman Michael
E. Toner argued that a viable candidate for the 2008 presidential election
would have to have raised $100 million by the end of 2007.86 Presidential can-
didates John Kerry and George W. Bush raised and spent beyond that in 2004,
reaching a combined total of over $600 million.'87 Spending has increased
1800% between 1970 and 2006 when adjusting for inflation.'88 This trend con-
tinued in the 2008 election. Federal candidates for the 2008 election raised
over $2.7 billion.
89
Presidential contributions represented a large portion of the total with
Barack Obama raising $639.2 million, Hillary Clinton $221 million, and John
McCain $335.3 million.' 9 Media advertisements accounted for over one-third
184 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-2.
185 See Taylor & Omstein, supra note 71, at 1 ("As the cost of political communication
keeps rising, the competitive playing field of campaigns keeps tilting toward candidates who
are wealthy or well-financed."); see also Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d
432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court noted that:
[A]s our practices of equality in voting have grown, our opportunities for equality in
seeking office have shrunk. Once again, wealth is a barrier to democratic practice. To-
day it is not State statutes, but the extraordinary cost of running a campaign that keeps
all but those who can raise vast amounts of money from seeking office. If we do not
drastically alter our campaign practices, only those who are wealthy, or who are chosen
by the wealthy will be able to compete for elective office. This is an outrage in a de-
mocratic nation.
Id. (quoting Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 151
(1971) (testimony of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie)).
186 See Edsall & Cillizza, supra note 9.
187 See Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Race, http://www.opensecrets.
org/pres04/index.php?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
188 Hearing on S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Rules and Administration); see also Center for Responsive Politics, Presidential
Fundraising and Spending 1976-2008, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/totals.php (last
visited Nov. 16, 2008) (indicating a more than 1800% increase in spending for presidential
elections from $66.9 million in 1976 to $1.3 billion in 2008).
189 Fed. Election Comm'n, Presidential Campaign Finance, http://www.fec.gov/
DisclosureSearch/mapApp.do (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (noting presidential candidates
received approximately $1.2 billion from individuals, $5.1 million from political action
committees, and $103.6 million in federal funds, and contributed approximately $55.6 mil-
lion themselves); Fed. Election Comm'n, 2008 House and Senate Campaign Finance, http://
www.fec.gov/DisclosureSearch/mapHSApp.do (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (noting House
candidates received contributions of $894 million and Senate candidates received $417.6
million).
190 Presidential Campaign Finance, supra note 189. Former presidential candidates raised
a substantial amount of money as well: Mitt Romney ($105.1 million), John Edwards ($48.1
million), Ron Paul ($34.5 million), Rudy Giuliani ($58.7 million), and Mike Huckabee
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of presidential campaign spending. 9' Barack Obama and John McCain com-
bined spent over $360 million on television advertising during the 2008 elec-
tion. 92 These astronomical amounts are not reserved for presidential candidates
alone; House ($894.1 million) and Senate ($417.6 million) candidates also
raised significant sums in the 2008 election cycle.'93
The money raised and spent in the 2008 election cycle demonstrates that
candidates not only need to spend large amounts of money in order to be com-
petitive, but a large percentage of that money must be spent on broadcast ad-
vertising. This appears to reduce candidate diversity in two ways. First, it pro-
vides incumbents with an advantage that is hard for challengers to overcome.1 4
Second, it acts as a barrier to entry to federal office for those who do not have
easy access to funds.'95 As access to funds does not necessarily equate to the
quality of a candidate, the system should be modified so that the pool of candi-
dates is not so dependent on fundraising.
V. PROPOSALS FOR A SYSTEM OF FREE AIRTIME
In order to increase candidate diversity and strengthen free speech objec-
tives, Congress should create a system that attempts to guarantee election
competition by ensuring that all viable candidates, even those without deep
($16.1 million). Id.
'9' See Andrei Scheinkman, Xaquin G.V. & Stephan Weitberg, The Ad Wars, http:!!
elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/advertising/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008)
(noting over $450 million was spent on political advertising between April 3 and November
5, 2008); Center for Responsive Politics, Presidential Fundraising and Spending 1976-2008,
supra note 188 (noting presidential spending in 2008 totaled $1.3 billion).
192 See Scheinkman et al., supra note 191 (noting Obama spent approximately $236 mil-
lion on television advertisements and McCain spent $125.5 million). Obama and McCain
made a significant portion of their total television advertising expenditures in the weeks
immediately preceding the general election; Obama spent over $80 million on media pur-
chases and John McCain spent over $19.3 million. Fed. Election Comm'n, Disbursements
by Purpose for Obama for America, http://query.nictusa.com/pres/2008/12G/C00431445/
B_PURPOSE_C00431445.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008); Fed. Election Comm'n, Dis-
bursements by Purpose for McCain-Palin 2008 Inc., http://query.nictusa.com/pres/2008/
12G/C00453928/BPURPOSEC00453928.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
193 2008 House and Senate Campaign Finance, supra note 189.
194 See Center for Responsive Politics, Incumbent Advantage, http://www.opensecrets.
org/bigpicture/incumbs.asp?Cycle=2006 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (indicating the dispar-
ity of campaign funds between incumbents and challengers).
195 See Jonathan D. Salant, A Richer Congress: Nearly Halofo Incoming Freshmen are
Millionaires, AssOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 25, 2002, available at http://www.commondreams.
org/headlines02/1225-02.htm ("Almost 43 percent of the incoming [congressional] fresh-
men ... are millionaires, compared with 1 percent of the American public."); see also Hear-
ing on S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Comm. on
Rules and Administration) (discussing how a candidate needs to advertise on television to
win and emphasizing the costs of running television advertisements).
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pockets, have an opportunity to deliver their message.'96 In recognition of can-
didates' reliance on broadcast media and the effectiveness of this medium to
transmit candidates' messages, the best way to increase the pool of candidates
available to run for office is to establish a system of voluntary free airtime for
federal candidates.'97 The system would provide a right of access to the politi-
cal process for those individuals excluded by the current systems' focus on
fundraising. Furthermore, because the program would be voluntary, candidates
who reap the benefits of the current system may continue to do so.
A. Free Airtime: Constitutional?
The Supreme Court has addressed the delicate balance between the First
Amendment rights of the public and those of broadcasters on several occa-
sions ' and has found that the First Amendment rights of the public are para-
mount.'99 This reflects the general view that the regulation of broadcasters is
subject to a less stringent standard of First Amendment review than other
forms of media expression."' This less stringent review is based largely on
broadcasters' use of a scarce medium, the broadcast spectrum.20 ' The decisions
196 See generally Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71 (advocating free airtime for candi-
dates as a way to increase competition and reduce the influence of money in politics);
Julianne F. Flowers, Audrey A. Haynes & Michael H. Crespin, The Media, the Campaign,
and the Message, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 (2003) (discussing the importance of the candidate
message).
197 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 2; see also infra note 208.
198 E.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("Balancing the
various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what
best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty.").
199 E.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see MEDIA POLICY PRO-
GRAM, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., THE OUR DEMOCRACY, OUR AIRWAVES ACT IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL 3 (2003), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1437.pdf ("[T]he First
Amendment rights of the public ... are 'paramount,' and . . . should be 'the foremost con-
cem' of any regulation of the spectrum."(internal citation omitted)).
200 See Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101-03; see also Taylor & Ornstein, supra
note 71, at 21-22. Taylor and Ornstein propose a system of free airtime that would apply
only to broadcasters not other forms of media such as cable television. Id. This is largely
because cable television operators are free from obligations that accompanying spectrum,
and limitations on cable television would therefore be subject to a stricter standard of First
Amendment review. Id.
201 Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101 ("Because the broadcast media utilize a
valuable and limited public resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amend-
ment values."). Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 ("It quickly became apparent that broadcast fre-
quencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only
by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because




in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.2 and NBC v. United States.3 demon-
strate the less stringent First Amendment protection that the Court provides to
broadcasters.2 4
In NBC, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the licensing system es-
tablished by the 1934 Act and determined that denial of a license based on a
station's failure to meet its public interest obligation did not violate the broad-
caster's First Amendment right. 5
Furthermore, in Red Lion, the Supreme Court determined that the fairness
doctrine requiring broadcasters to devote time to a bipartisan presentation of
issues was constitutional."° The Supreme Court noted that even though broad-
casters have First Amendment rights, the government has a substantial interest
in regulating broadcasters to ensure coverage of public issues."7 Additionally,
in Buckley, the Supreme Court suggested that the presidential system of public
financing was constitutional because it was voluntary."' Since a system of free
airtime would involve a voluntary form of public financing, the rationale in
Buckley should apply.2 "9
Aside from Supreme Court precedent, lower courts have rendered similar
decisions. The common determination is that the government has a legitimate
interest in designing regulations to foster political communications." In CBS
v. FCC, the Court held that the statutory right of access granted to candidates
under section 312 of the 1934 Act survived First Amendment scrutiny because
it properly balanced the rights of candidates, the public, and broadcasters. 2
Like the statute at issue in CBS, a free airtime provision would create a statu-
202 395 U.S. at 367.
203 NBCv. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
204 See supra Part II.B.
205 NBC, 319 U.S. at 226-27 (relying, in part, on the limited availability of the spec-
trum).
206 RedLion, 395 U.S. at 369-71, 375, 400-01.
207 See id. at 386-87, 389-90; see also supra Part II.A-B. The government is able to
regulate broadcasters based on the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum, and the reasoning that
it is the first amendment right of the viewer, not the broadcaster that is paramount. Red Lion
Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
208 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65, 90-93 (1976) (per curiam). The Court
discussed limitation of political contributions in a footnote:
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition ac-
ceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified ex-
penditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contribu-
tions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept pub-
lic funding.
Id. at 57 n.65.
209 Id. (reasoning that a candidate has the right to accept or reject public financing).
210 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 1-11 (1980), affid CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453
U.S. 367 (1981).
211 CBS, 453 U.S. at 397.
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tory and right of access for federal candidates,"2 which they could voluntarily
accept or reject like public campaign funds. In light of similar reasoning from
the Supreme Court and appellate courts, it appears that free airtime provisions
would withstand any First Amendment challenges.2"3 However, free airtime
proposals must also overcome Fifth Amendment taking challenges."'
Taking issues arise when broadcasters are forced to provide either free air-
time or reduced rates that could result in a government taking of property-a
reduction of commercial profits because the companies were temporary de-
prived of spectrum use-without due process."5 However, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that broadcasters have no property right in the spec-
trum.2"6 This concept is reiterated in statute and case law.2"7 Section 304 of the
1934 Act states "[n]o station license shall be granted by the [FCC] until the
applicant therefor shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular fre-
quency or of the electromagnetic spectrum . 2 8 Thus in FCC v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station, the Supreme Court interpreted section 304 to mean
that a grant of a license does not result in a property right for broadcasters.29
Since broadcasters do not have a property right in the spectrum, free airtime
provisions would not result in a taking.
B. Free Airtime: Practical?
A system of free airtime should contain three basic provisions. First, it
should set up a system of broadcast vouchers for political campaigns. Second,
it should require broadcast stations to set aside specific times for balanced can-
didate and issue centered programming. Third, it should contain some qualify-
ing mechanism to ensure only viable and serious candidates have access to
212 See id at 396-97.
213 JOSEPH E. CANTOR, DENIS STEVEN RuTKus & KEVIN B. GREELY, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, FREE AND REDUCE-RATE TELEVISION TIME FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 26
(1997).
214 See Hearing on S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Scott E. Thomas, Dickstein
Shapiro LLP).
215 CANTOR ET AL., supra note 213, at 36 ("In making the 'takings' argument, broadcast-
ers essentially contend that a requirement to provide free air time for political advertise-
ments would deprive them of air time that could be sold to commercial advertisers and thus
diminish the advertising revenues that could be realized from the use of the license.").
216 Id. at 29-30; see MEDIA POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 199, at 6 ("[T]he free [air] time
requirement is a refinement of the public interest obligation already attached to the license,
it cannot be construed as a 'taking' that has unconstitutionally reduced the value of their
license.").
217 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
475 (1940).
218 Communications Act of 1934 § 304, 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
219 Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. at 475.
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airtime. In addition, free airtime proposals should satisfy a variety of objectives
including (1) leveling the playing field by providing access to the political
process for all candidates regardless of socioeconomic backgrounds and (2)
increasing the flow of political information through the broadcast media, in
effect, educating the viewing public. 2 0
1. Foreign Implementations of Political Airtime
Free media for politicians is not a new concept; a 2001 study found that
"free airtime is the most widely used campaign finance regulation in the
world. 221 Of the sixty countries surveyed, only seven failed to provide any free
airtime to their candidates, including the United States, Ecuador, and Tanza-
nia. Many countries throughout Europe have developed a system of free air-
time and some have limited purchased advertising.223 For example, Germany's
Law on Political Parties prohibits candidates from purchasing public television
or radio airtime, but requires broadcasters to provide free airtime. 24
In the United Kingdom, the government banned paid political advertising,
which the country recently reaffirmed in the Communications Act of 2003
("2003 U.K. Act").22 ' The 2003 U.K. Act provides that an advertisement vio-
lates the ban on political advertising if it is "inserted by or on behalf of a body
whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature" or if the "advertise-
ment..., is directed towards a political end. '226
220 See Taylor & Omstein, supra note 71, at 15.
221 Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 16. Indeed, free media is a more popular type of
campaign finance reform than "bans on corporate contributions, spending limits, [or] contri-
bution limits." Id.
222 Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Five Free Airtime Facts . . . and One Proposal,
http://www.wisdc.org/free-air-facts.php (June 11, 2002). The other countries lacking free
airtime included Honduras, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
223 Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, Party Funding in Continental Western Europe, in FUNDING
OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 117 at 126-27 (2003), available at http://
www.idea.int/publications/funding_parties/upload/chapter 7.pdf. European countries offer a
variety of other public financing for political campaigns, including free train travel, free
telephone and computer costs. Id. at 126.
224 Germany Info, Background Papers, Party and Campaign Finance in Germany: An
Overview, http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/archives/background/partyfinance.html.
225 Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §§ 319, 321 (U.K.). In 2008, the House of Lords
rejected a challenge to the ban on political advertisements stating that there was "a pressing
social need" in approving the ban to preserve a balanced "playing field" and to prevent
"well-endowed interests" from using "the power of the purse to give enhanced prominence
to their views." Ban on Broadcast Political Advertising Is Justified, TIMES (London), Mar.
17, 2008, at 63.
226 Communications Act, § 321(2). Advertisements that are considered "of a political
nature" include those that "influence[] the outcome of elections or referendums ... bring[]
about changes in the law or otherwise influencing the legislative process [ or] ... the poli-
cies or decisions of local, regional, or national governments .... " COMMUNICATIONS ACT
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The British system requires broadcast stations to offer free campaign media
broken into two different categories: Party Political Broadcasts ("PPB") and
Referendum Campaign Broadcast ("RCB").227 PPBs serve as the main way for
political parties to get their message out, completely free of broadcaster's in-
terpretation." 8 By and large, Britain supports free broadcasting, as evidenced
by its ban on political advertising and the system of free airtime, which pre-
vents disparity among parties' access to the broadcast media."9
A multitude of countries throughout Latin America have incorporated free
media into their electoral process.23 Candidates in Latin America are generally
subjected to four different policies that increase to the media
(a) free air time on public television channels and radio frequencies, (b) free air time
on the entire radio and television network ... (c) air time paid for by the state and di-
vided between the various parties, and (d) assigning part of the direct public funding
available for the purpose of broadcasting political advertising.23'
As an example, Brazil prohibits paid political advertisements, but mandates
that broadcast stations provide political parties with a free daily time slot for
political advertising. 2 2 The policy began in 1962 and is known as Hordrio Gra-
tuito de Propaganda Eleitoral or Free Electoral Political Advertising Time.233
In 2002, when Brazil had a combined total of nearly 19,000 candidates for
federal and local office, television stations aired nearly two hours worth of po-
2003, EXPLANATORY NOTES 138, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/en/ukpgaen_
20030021_en.pdf.
227 See Communications Act, 2003, c.21 § 333 (U.K.); ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PARTY
POLITICAL BROADCASTING 11 (2003), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
_data/assets/electoral_commission pdffile/0018/16047/Finalversion_7607-6718EN
S W _.pdf
228 See ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 227, at 11; see also Press Release, Electoral




229 See ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 227, at 15; see also Ban on Broadcast Po-
litical Advertising Is Justified, supra note 225.
230 Daniel Zovatto, The Legal and Practical Characteristics of the Funding of Political
Parties and Election Campaigns in Latin America, in FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, supra note 223, at 95, 106-07. These countries include "Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru [and] Uruguay." Id. at 106.
231 Id. at 107.
232 Id. at 106-07. Based partly on the high number of candidates for office and partly on
the small amount of time given to each candidate Brazil's program has resulted in numerous
colorful ads, including one candidate repeating his name non-stop for thirty seconds and
other candidates incorporating the use of live animals. Alex Bellos, TV Democracy in Ac-
tion, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 2, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct /02/brazil.
worlddispatch.
233 Mauro P. Porto, Framing Controversies: Television and the 2002 Presidential Elec-
tion in Brazil, 24.1 POL. COMM. 19, 20 (2007).
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litical programming daily. 34 Two hours of political advertising may seem ex-
cessive, but in Brazil television is "very influential ... not just in politics but in
everyday life. Television dictates fashions and [behaviors]." '235 In fact, 40% of
homes tuned in during the first few weeks of political broadcasts. 36 Further-
more, 68% of Brazil's television watching population believes that "political
advertising programs on TV should continue." '237
The Brazilian system divides candidate airtime proportionately according to
the number of seats the party has in congress; this policy tends to favor incum-
bents.238 The unfortunate drawback is that candidates for the same office are
given drastically different time slots, and those candidates with more time of-
ten win. 39 One interesting aspect of the Brazilian system is that candidates who
believe that they are the target of an unfair attack may "win back minutes of
TV time from his rival's broadcasts. '2 °
Despite some problems with the Brazilian system, some experts believe that
"political broadcasts are a fundamental part of Brazilian democracy. ' '24 Poli-
cies that provide free airtime for politicians throughout the world may not be
perfect, but they are valuable in providing equitable access to media for candi-
dates from all socioeconomic backgrounds.242
2. United States Implementation of Free Political Airtime
Free access to broadcasting can work in the United States as well. In 2002
234 Bellos, supra note 232. Brazil's population puts a unique amount of trust in their
broadcasters; a study that asked people "to evaluate the performance of nine institutions,"
revealed that participants "placed the Catholic Church in first place and TV Globo [Brazil's
most popular station] in second." Porto, supra note 233, at 20. Additionally, the majority of
participants rated TV Globo as "good" or "excellent." Id.
235 Bellos, supra note 232.
236 Id. After the first couple weeks, the number dropped to 25%. Id. This still appears to
be a significant number in terms of actual population, considering an estimated 90% of Bra-
zilian homes have television. John Fitzpatrick, Image Salesmen, BRAZZIL, May 2002,
http://www.brazzil.com/ p22mayO2.htm. Brazilians are avid television viewers and political
parties know it. Id.
237 Porto, supra note 233, at 31.
238 Id. at 20. ("One third is distributed in equal shares between all registered candidates,
and two thirds are divided according to the number of seats that each party or coalition has
in the lower house of Congress."); see also Bellos, supra note 232.
239 See Bellos, supra note 232.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 It is worth noting that many of these countries do not have the same strong belief in
free speech as the United States. For example, European countries have long-restricted
speech that may lead to "incitement to race hatred and other undesirable motivations;" the
exact type of speech that the First Amendment uniquely protects. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott,
The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and European Ap-
proaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 305, 309 (1999).
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and 2003, the pioneers of campaign finance reform, Senators John McCain,
Russ Feingold, and Richard Durbin, introduced the Political Campaign Broad-
cast Activity Improvements Act ("PCBAI") and the Our Democracy, Our Air-
waves Act ("ODOA").243 These bills quickly followed the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 2" and were intended as a compliment to the
BCRA.245 BCRA focused on reforming the corrupting influence of big dollar
donors. 2' The PCBAI and ODOA focused on the demand side of campaign
finance-attempting to "reduce candidates' need to secure resources though
all-consuming fundraising activities while increasing the flow of political in-
formation through broadcast media.""24
The PCBAI and ODOA both contained requirements that forced broadcast
stations to air "at least [two] hours per week of candidate-centered program-
ming or issue-centered programming," 248 which would help broadcasters fulfill
their public interest obligations. 9 This proposal would have resulted in nearly
twelve hours of political programming in the six weeks prior to the election.25
Furthermore, broadcasters would have been required to air some of these seg-
ments during prime time hours.'
The two bills also would have provided qualifying candidates and national
parties with broadcast vouchers up to $750 million for use on political adver-
tisements on television and radio. 52 U.S. House candidates would qualify for
the vouchers after raising a minimum of $25,000 in individual contributions;253
243 See 148 Cong. Rec. 15, 20,930 (2002) (statement of Sen. John McCain); 149 Cong.
Rec. 15, 20,192 (2003) (statement of Sen. John McCain); see also JOHN SAMPLES AND
ADAM D. THIERER, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS No. 480, WHY SUBSIDIZE THE SOAPBOX?
THE MCCAIN FREE AIRTIME PROPOSAL AND THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTING 2 (2003).
244 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (amending scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C.) invalidated in part by McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm., 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
245 McCain, supra note 111, at 172.
246 Id. BCRA focused on the limited use of soft money in federal elections. See MICHAEL
J. MALBIN & SEAN A. CAIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., THE UPS AND DOWNS OF SMALL AND
LARGE DONORS 4 (2007), available at http://www.cfinst.orgfbooks-reports/SmallDonors/
Small-Large-DonorsJune2007.pdf.
247 McCain, supra note 11, at 172.
248 Our Democracy, Our Airwaves Act, S. 1497, 108th Cong. § 3(a)(l)(A) (2003); Politi-
cal Campaign Broadcast Activity Improvements Act, S. 3124, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(A)
(2002). The two-hour mandate was applicable only during six weeks before the election. Id.
249 See S. 1497, § 3(a).
250 SAMPLES & THIERER, supra note 243, at 2.
251 See S. 1497, § 3(a)(1)(B) (providing the provisions of the ODOA); McCain, supra
note 111, at 175 (discussing the PCBAI). The bills required "[h]alf of these segments [to] air
between 5 p.m. and 11:35 p.m., and no segment airing in the earliest hours of the morning
would count toward this requirement." McCain, supra note 111, at 176.
252 S. 1497, Sec. 4(a), §§ 315A(a), (b)(l), (d)(1) (ODOA); McCain, supra note 111, at
175 (PCBAI). The $750 million cap was for the 2004 election, and was "indexed to inflation
in future federal election years." Id. at 176.
253 S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A (b)(2)(C)(i) (ODOA); McCain, supra note 111, at 176
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yet, U.S. Senate candidates would qualify only after raising a minimum of
$25,000 in individual contributions "multiplied by the number of Representa-
tives from the State in which the individual seeks election." '254 After Senate and
House candidates qualified they would receive $3 in broadcast vouchers for
every $1 received in individual contributions. 55 U.S. House candidates would
not be eligible for more than $375,000 in vouchers, and U.S. Senate candidates
would be capped at $375,000 per congressional district in the state.256 Finally,
the vouchers would be funded by a spectrum use fee levied on no more than
"one percent of the gross annual revenues of broadcast license holders. 257
The PCBAI and ODOA provisions that required broadcasters to air twelve
hours of programming received some condemnation. 8 Critics argued the bill
reduced broadcaster choice by limiting broadcasters' control over the content
aired during those hours and by dictating the format to be used in the required
programming. Critics also argued that this requirement would constitute a tax
on broadcasters who would not be compensated for their lost airtime. 60 Facing
tough criticism from the broadcast industry, both bills failed. However, the
Senators were not deterred-two of the primary sponsors of PCBAI and
ODOA introduced similar legislation in 2007.261
3. Fair Elections Now Act
On May 3, 2007 Senators Richard Durbin, Arlen Specter, Russ Feingold and
Barack Obama introduced the Fair Elections Now Act ("FENA").26 2 The bill
(PCBAI). House candidates would also agree not to spend "more than $125,000 of personal
or family funds on the campaign." McCain, supra note 111, at 176; see also S. 1497, sec.
4(a), § 315A (b)(2)(C)(ii). However, the bills allowed House candidates to exchange their
vouchers with their political parties. S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315(t); McCain, supra note 111, at
177.
254 S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A (b)(2)(D)(i) (ODOA); McCain, supra note 111, at 176
(PCBAI). Senate candidates "must also agree not to use more than $500,000 of personal or
family funds on the campaign." McCain, supra note 111, at 176; see also S. 1497, sec. 4(a),
§ 315A (b)(2)(D)(ii). However, the bills also allowed Senate candidates to exchange their
vouchers with their political parties. S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A(f); McCain, supra note 111,
at 177.
255 S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A(d)(2)(A) (ODOA) McCain, supra note 111, at 177
(PCBAI).
256 S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A(d)(2)(B) (ODOA) McCain, supra note 111, at 177
(PCBAI).
257 S. 1497, sec. 4(a), § 315A(h) (ODOA) McCain, supra note 111, at 175 (PCBAI).
258 See, e.g., SAMPLES &. THIERER, supra note 243, at 2.
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1285, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
262 S. 1285, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). Surprisingly, Sen. John McCain chose not to sign on
to FENA despite a history of being a champion of campaign finance and sponsoring similar
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would establish a voluntary system of public financing for viable Senate can-
didates,63 eliminating the requirement that broadcasters show candidate and
issue-centered programming while keeping the broadcast vouchers proposal of
the previous legislation.264 The voucher system proposed by FENA is simple.
First, candidates would have to show that they were participating candi-
dates, which requires certification from the FEC.265 Second, the candidate
would have to demonstrate viability, established by raising a minimum amount
of funds.266 Senate candidates would be required to raise qualifying contribu-
tions equal to $2000 plus "[$]500 for each congressional district in excess of
[one] in the State with respect to which the candidate is seeking election.2 67
Qualifying contributions are those that come from individuals and do not ex-
ceed five dollars.268
Once a candidate has raised the required amount of qualifying funds and
agreed not to spend any funds besides those for which the bill provides, the
candidate could qualify for broadcast vouchers. 269 The broadcast vouchers
would be disbursed to certified Senate candidates in the "aggregate amount
equal to $100,000 multiplied by the number of congressional districts in the
State with respect to which such candidate is running for office.2 7 ° The amount
available to each candidate is consistent with the amount many Senatorial can-
didates spend on broadcast advertising absent vouchers.'
reforms in the past. Press Release, Public Campaign & Common Cause, Statement by Re-
form Groups on Presidential Financing Claims (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.
commondreams.org/news2008/0222-09.htm. There is some discussion that Sen. McCain's
failure to sign on to the bill was based largely on his need to appeal to the conservative wing
of the Republican party for his presidential campaign. See Susan Milligan, McCain's Com-
mitment to Public Financing Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2008, at A10.
263 See generally S. 1285. While, not discussed in this paper, FENA also attempts to
establish a system of voluntary public financing that would provide Senate candidates with a
base amount of $750,000, plus $150,000 for every Congressional district in the state in ex-
cess of one. Sec. 102, § 5 10(d). The act would also provide matching funds for Senate can-
didates whose opponents are privately funded. Sec. 102, § 511.
264 See S. 1285, sec. 202(a), § 315A. A similar bill, the "Clean Money, Clean Elections
Act of 2007" was introduced in the house. H.R. 1614, 110th Cong. (2007). The House ver-
sion of the bill does not contain a broadcast voucher provision, but instead contains a provi-
sion that would provide "30 minutes of free broadcast time" for the primary election and
"75 minutes of free broadcast time" during the general election. Id. § 201(2).
265 S. 1285, sec. 102, §§ 503(a)(1), § 508(a).
266 Id. sec. 102, §§ 503(a)(3), 505(a).
267 Id. § 505(a).
268 Id. § 501(11).
269 See id. sec. 202(a) §§ 315A(a),(b); see also id. sec. 102, §§ 501(10), 503(a)(4)(A),
508(a).
270 Id. sec. 202(a), § 315A(c).
271 For example, in the 2000 election, Sen. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut spent
$420,000 on broadcast advertising. Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 24. Connecticut has
five congressional districts. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Congressional Apportionment, tbl. 1,
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On the other hand, FENA also recognizes that some Senators may come
from states in which broadcast advertising is not effective-for instance, if the
candidate is running in a non-competitive race.272 Accordingly, FENA allows
candidates to exchange for cash all or part of their broadcast voucher, if this
cash better serves the candidates' needs.
Additionally, the bill would establish two different frameworks for raising
the funds necessary to support the voucher program. First, the public financing
provision would be funded by a variety of sources including proceeds from
spectrum auctions, excess spectrum user fees, voluntary contributions, qualify-
ing contributions, program penalties and investment returns.274 Second, the
broadcast voucher provision would be funded from the "Political Advertising
Voucher Account" ("Voucher Account"). 275 A spectrum use fee of 2% would
be assessed to fund the Voucher Account; at the end of the election any excess
funds would be deposited into the Senate Fair Elections Fund.276 In effect, this
system would establish a reimbursement program for broadcasters; they pay
into the system to fund the vouchers, and then candidates reimburse broadcast-
ers by exchanging the vouchers for airtime. 77
While FENA, ODOA, and PCBAI were positive attempts to address the ris-
ing costs of running a campaign, especially in regard to political advertising,
each bill fell short individually of creating the ideal system. To be effective, a
system of free airtime must combine the two related proposals-vouchers and
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/maps/files/tab01.pdf. Under FENA, Lie-
berman would be qualified to receive $500,000 in broadcast vouchers. The bill also includes
a provision that would amend the lowest unit cost provision of section 315 by barring
broadcaster preemption of political advertisements. See S. 1285, § 201; see also Hearing on
S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Scott E. Thomas, Attorney, Dickestein Shapiro LLP)
(discussing the possibility of litigation, commenced by broadcasters, over the obligation to
offer reduced rates to candidates).
272 See S.1285, 110th Cong., sec. 202(a), §§ 315A(d)(1)-(2); see also McCain, supra
note 111, at 177 (explaining that under the PCBAI, "[t]he rationale for a candidate's ability
to trade vouchers to [his or her] party is that in some media markets broadcast advertising
for a candidate is cost-prohibitive .... ).
273 Fair Election Now Act, S.1285, 110th Cong. Sec 202, § 3 15A(d) (2007). The political
parties may only spend the vouchers on "generic party advertising, to support a candidate
for State or local office in a general election, or to support participating candidates of the
party in general election." Id. sec. 202, § 315A(d)(1)(B).
274 S. 1285 sec. 102, § 502. The provisions requiring proceeds from spectrum auctions
would amend section 309(j)(8)(E)(ii) of the 1934 Communications Act to require that only
90% of proceeds be deposited into the "Digital Television Transition and Public Safety
Fund" and 10% of proceeds into the Senate Fair Elections Fund. Id. at § 111.
275 Id. at sec. 202, § 315A(f).
276 Id.
277 See FAIR ELECTIONS Now ACT, SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 5, http://www.
commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C 17E2-CDD 1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665%7D/FAIR
%20ELECTIONS%20NOW%20ACT%20SECTION-BY-SECTION%20ANALYSIS.PDF
(last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
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mandatory political or issue airtime. Additionally, a system of free airtime
must require adequate candidate qualification.
First, broadcast vouchers programs attempt to level the field by providing
access to advertising to all candidates regardless of their ability to raise funds.
Furthermore, broadcast vouchers would help to increase and diversify free
speech.27 The decline in substantive campaign coverage by local news stations
has forced candidates to rely heavily on political advertisements to educate
voters.279 Unfortunately, this further limits the pool of candidates who are avail-
able to run for office to those who are either individually wealthy or have ac-
cess to vast fundraising networks.2"' The Supreme Court has determined that
regulation of the public interest requires providing access to individuals from
all economic backgrounds.' Providing candidates with vouchers will encour-
age individuals to run for office, thereby increasing political discourse.2"2
Such political funding has already increased the discourse to some effect at
the state level.2 3 While, the state campaign finance systems do not provide
broadcast vouchers, they do provide a system of public financing for state can-
didates in a similar effort to level the field.8" State public financing systems
have resulted in an increased number of women and minority candidates run-
ning for state office.2 5 Implementing a system of broadcast vouchers on the
278 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976). Public funding does not "abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather... facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public discussion . ... "
Id. "[T]he public interest in providing access to the marketplace of "ideas and experiences"
would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially afflu-
ent, or those with access to wealth." CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
123 (1973).
279 See Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 11. The authors list the need to raise large
sums of money as one reason why quality challengers often do not enter elections. Id. at 1.
280 Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., McCain, Feingold, Durbin Move to Boost
Broadcast Coverage of Elections, Issues (Jul. 30, 2003), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/press-801 .html.
[T]he high cost of reaching the public on the nation's most widely-used communica-
tions resources-television and radio-stifles democratic debate, deprives the public of
the[] ... need to make educated voting choices, and scares many potential candidates
away from running in the first place. It has been national policy since the 1920s that
radio and TV broadcasters should give something back to the public in return for the
use of the airwaves. This policy remains valid - and much needed by the public today.
Id.d28 See CBS, 412 U.S. at 123.
282 ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, POLITICAL ADVERTISING VOUCHERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES: WHAT DIFFERENCE COULD THEY MAKE? 20 (July 2005), available at http://
www.cfinst.org/books reports/pdffMediaVouchers.pdf.
283 See Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Funding: An Effective and Legally Viable Model for
Campaign Finance Reform in the States, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 747 (2007) (discussing
the effect of public funding in Maine).
284 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2008).
285 See Jarrett Keohokalole, Hawai'i Clean Elections: Voter Owned Hawai'i Wants to
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federal level should provide the same opportunities while helping to promote
speech from a wider and more diverse pool of candidates. "6
The second necessary provision in ideal legislation to address the rising
costs of running a campaign is a requirement that broadcasters air a set amount
of candidate and issued-centered programming."' Like a system of broadcast
vouchers, a required amount of candidate and issue-centered programming
helps to level the field by providing access to all candidates. Additionally, an
obligation placed on broadcasters to air issue-centered programming would
provide real in-depth substantive coverage, beyond the theatrics of political
advertising. 88 The programming should include educational programs such as
debates and candidate statements289 and should provide broadcasters with
enough flexibility to choose which races and formats best suit their market.29°
This will prove valuable to the political process, as studies have shown that an
increase in political knowledge correlates to voter turnout and participation. 9
Interestingly, despite the obligations that free airtime and mandatory issue-
centered programming would impose on broadcasters, there seems to be some
support amongst a variety of broadcast networks on the local and national
level.292 For example, in 2006, Belo Corp., a Texas broadcaster, provided free
airtime to over one hundred local and federal candidates in their "It's Your
Time" program.2" Furthermore, the E.W. Scripps Co., which owns a variety of
ABC and NBC affiliated stations, launched a similar program titled "Democ-
racy 2008. '294 Unfortunately, voluntary free airtime and issue-centered pro-
Keep Campaign Finance Corruption-Free, HONOLULU WEEKLY, Mar. 22, 2006, available at
http://honoluluweekly.com/cover/2006/03/hawaii-clean-elections.
286 See BOATRIGHT, supra note 282, at 20.
287 Our Democracy, Our Airwaves Act, S. 1497, 108th Cong., § 3 (2003).
288 See Taylor & Ornstein, supra note 71, at 17.
289 S. 1497, § 3(b).
290 See Public Interest Notice, supra note 161, 37.
291 See SAMPLES & THIERER, supra note 243, at 6.
292 See Public Interest Notice, supra note 161, 35.
293 Press Release, Belo Corp., Belo Television Stations Provided 146 Candidates Free
Airtime During the 2006 Political Season (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.belo.
com/pressRelease.x2?release=20061130-1073.html. The "It's Your Time" program was
instituted in 1996 to "help viewers understand issues facing their local communities. Candi-
dates participating in [the program] each receive five minutes of free airtime. Since the pro-
gram's inception, Belo has provided free airtime to more than 700 candidates in six con-
secutive election cycles including 2006." Id.
294 Press Release, E.W. Scripps Co., Scripps Making Free Airtime Available to Candi-
dates in Upcoming Campaigns: Television Stations Launching Democracy 2008 Initiative
(Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&
STORY=/www/story/02-27-2008/0004763635&EDATE = . The Scripps program included
five daily minutes to candidates in the thirty days leading up to the election, election related




gramming by broadcasters is minimal at best, and statutory requirements are
necessary to achieve the optimal impact.2 95
To compliment the first and second provisions, the third and final provision
necessary for an effective system of free airtime is a qualification requirement.
The qualification requirement should ensure that only serious and credible
candidates receive free airtime or broadcast vouchers. The best way to estab-
lish such a system is through the use of qualifying contributions as discussed in
FENA.2 96 The system should create a balance by setting the qualifications suf-
ficiently low to allow challengers to meet the threshold, while being careful not
to set the bar so low that any individual is able to test the "campaign waters" at
the expense of the U.S. Treasury.297
C. Free Airtime: Affordable?
One commonly cited criticism of a system of free airtime or any publicly
funded system is that it results in welfare for politicians, stealing money from
other more important programs.98 This is simply not the case. In fact, funding
for free airtime vouchers would not come from a general fund, but from a "Po-
litical Advertising Voucher Account" created specifically for the purpose of
broadcast vouchers and funded by spectrum use fees.299
As one might imagine this idea has been met with some resistance from
broadcasters.3" However, the proposed spectrum use fee would not place a
heavy burden on broadcasters. Traditionally, broadcasters have not paid for the
use of the spectrum."' Congress conferred this benefit because it considered
broadcasters as public trustees; they pay nothing, and, in turn, they must oper-
ate in the public interest. 2 However, in recent years the public trustee model
has changed. Now, broadcasters may be forced to pay for their spectrum use
either when the FCC allocates additional parts of the spectrum for broadcaster
use (although this is rare) or when broadcasters obtain the use of the spectrum
295 See Public Interest Notice, supra note 161, 35-36.
296 Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1285, 110th Cong., sec. 102 §§ 505, 508 (2007).
297 See Hearing on S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Mem-
ber, S. Comm. On Rules and Admin.).
298 Id. (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell, Member, S. Comm. on Rules and Admin.).
299 S. 1285, sec. 202(a), §§ 315A(e)(3), (f)(1); see also Hearing on S. 1285, supra note
12 (statement of Scott E. Thomas, Attorney, Dickstein Shapiro LLP).
300 See Hearing on S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Scott E. Thomas, Attorney,
Dickstein Shapiro LLP).
301 Geller & Watts, supra note 160, at 1.
302 Id. This system resulted from a compromise struck by Congress between the interests
of free speech advocates, who wanted a common carrier system, and the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, who wanted to maintain control. Id at 2.
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from other broadcasters." 3 While the public trustee paradigm slowly is disinte-
grating, broadcasters nonetheless still profit from the current system.
This model sharply contrasts with other spectrum models such as spectrum
allocated for commercial wireless telephony. Wireless spectrum users pay for
the exclusive use of spectrum.3" In fact, since 1994 the FCC has used auctions
to allocate the electromagnetic spectrum rights to wireless service providers.3 5
Spectrum auctions were designed to reduce the time it takes for a first-time
applicant to receive a license3" as well as ensure-in theory-that the bidder
who values the spectrum most and will therefore optimally use the spectrum
will receive access to this limited resource. Spectrum auctions have generated
significant funds for the U.S. Treasury as winners pay anywhere from $1 mil-
lion to over $18 billion for spectrum.3"7 Yet, established broadcasters continue
to benefit by not having to pay for their spectrum use. These broadcasters earn
exceptional profit margins of up to 50% of revenues." The spectrum use fee
proposed by FENA would take only 2% of a broadcasters' gross annual reve-
nue, for an estimated combined total of $1.3 billion annually from the entire
industry.3 9
However, absent a 2% fee on broadcasters' annual revenue, the system
could be funded in a variety of other ways. For example, the public financing
303 Prior to 1994, the Commission relied on hearings and lotteries to distribute licenses.
See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, About Auctions, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?
job=about auctions (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
304 Spectrum Auctions, the Federal Budget and Public Policy: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on the Budget, 106th Cong. 571 (2000) (statement of Peter Cramton, President, Market De-
sign Inc.) ("Since, July 1994, the FCC has conducted two-dozen spectrum auctions, raising
over $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury ... ").
305 Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, About Auctions, supra note 303. Prior to 1994, the FCC
relied mainly on hearings and lotteries to distribute licenses. Id.
306 Id.
307 Fed. Commc'ns Comm., Auctions Summary, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.
htm?job-auctions all (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). The auction receivables are staggering;
the 2008 700Mhz auction awarded 1090 licenses and resulted in a gross bid of
$18,957,582,000. Id.
308 See MEDIA POLICY PROGRAM, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT
THE OUR DEMOCRACY, OUR AIRWAVES ACT 3 (2003), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/
attachments/1435.pdf; see also S. 1285, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin,
Member, S. Comm. on Rules and Admin.) In 2000, the "average profit margin was 46%."
Id.
309 Fair Elections Now Act, To Reform the Finance of Senate Elections an on the High
Cost of Broadcasting Campaign Advertisements: Hearing on S. 1285 Before the S. Comm.
on Rules and Administration, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Scott E. Thomas,
Attorney, Dickstein Shapiro LLP), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/
062007Thomas.pdf. There is some concern that this cost might eventually be passed off to
the consumer, although even critics are unsure how this would occur. Id. (prepared state-




provisions in FENA and state-level public financing could be funded, in part,
by voluntary tax check-offs and candidates' qualifying contributions.31 In ad-
dition, the state public financing systems are funded in party by a surcharge on
traffic fines.3"' A similar system combining a voluntary tax check-off, candi-
date qualifying contributions, and a surcharge on fines (criminal or otherwise)
could be used to fund a system of free airtime. The cost to tax payers would be
relatively minimal. The current FENA proposal in its entirety would cost
around $1.75 billion per two-year election cycle.32 Broken down among tax-
payers, it would result in just $4 per-citizen per-year.313 This is a small amount
relative to the significant improvements created by a system of free airtime that
increases candidate diversity and ensures free speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 2002, Congress and President George W. Bush took a monumental step
in the right direction, choosing to enact the BCRA in an effort to limit the
money supply (contributions) of the political marketplace.31 4 Once again, the
time has come to act. Congress should take steps toward limiting the demand
(campaign costs), and one of the best ways to do this is through a system of
free airtime for qualifying candidates. Free airtime may not solve every prob-
lem facing candidates and campaigns today, but it is a step in the right direc-
tion. It will encourage and strengthen free speech by leveling the playing field
and allowing individuals to run for office who otherwise would not be able to
afford the exponentially increasing media costs. Given the benefits provided by
a system of free airtime and the relatively low cost associated with the pro-
gram, the time has come to establish the system. Congress should "pass free air
time legislation and reclaim the airwaves for our democracy."'3 15
310 See, e.g., 16 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954 (2006).
311 See, e.g., id. ("an additional surcharge shall be imposed on all civil and criminal fines
and penalties").
312 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL. supra note 11, at 8. This estimate includes costs of
the entire program, including the broadcast vouchers and the system of public financing. Id.
at 6-8, 14 n.39.
313 Id. at 8.
314 McCain, supra note 111, at 171; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (amending scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.)
invalidated in part by McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm., 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
315 McCain, supra note 111, at 178.
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